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Africa, 1983

American Policy in Africa: The Reagan Years— <i>J. Gus Liebenow</i>	97
Kenya's Year of Discontent— <i>Patricia Stamp</i>	102
The Social and Economic Transformation of Zimbabwe— <i>Virginia Curtin Knight</i>	106
South Africa's Domestic Strategy— <i>Kenneth Grundy</i>	110
Revolution and the Military in Ghana— <i>Jon Kraus</i>	115
Continuing Problems in Africa's Horn— <i>W. A. E. Skurnik</i>	120
The Continuing Crisis in Angola— <i>Gerald Bender</i>	124
The Month in Review— <i>Country by Country, Day by Day</i>	139
Map—Africa—Inside Back Cover	

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Current History

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Whether the African states can diversify and expand their economies and utilize the influence of outside powers on the area are among the questions considered in this issue. The importance of the continent to the United States is underscored in our lead article, which points out that "it is clear that United States military arrangements . . . [in Africa] are predicated not on African interests alone but also on what the United States sees as the greater global threats. . . ."

American Policy in Africa: The Reagan Years

BY J. GUS LIEBENOW

Professor of Political Science, Indiana University

IN the opinion of many long-time observers of the African scene, the first two years of President Ronald Reagan's administration represent the nadir of official relations between the United States and the 50 states of the African continent. Admittedly, official American linkages with Africa have been brief. The European colonial powers had limited the kinds and intensity of contacts that both the Soviet Union and the United States had with Africans before the unravelling of colonial rule at the end of the 1950's. Thus the Reagan years are being judged in the context of a period that does not extend back more than a quarter of a century for the majority of African states. With respect to the United States, before the 1950's only Liberia and South Africa were exceptions to this generalization.

Not only has the period of direct African-American contacts been brief, it has also been pendulum-like. The indifference of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration towards Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sékou Touré of Guinea and the liberation movement in general was further compounded by the unfortunate turn taken by our involvement in the 1960 Congo (Zaire) crisis. This was followed by the euphoria of the John F. Kennedy period. The innovation of the Peace Corps and President Kennedy's stirring defense of liberty made him a kind of African "folk hero," whose photograph this author encountered plastered on the walls of huts in remote villages in Sierra Leone and Tanzania. After Kennedy's death, the United States-African relationship was marred by African hostility toward the war in Vietnam; President Richard Nixon's

policy of "benign neglect" toward South African apartheid; the revival of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support for the losing side in the Angolan war of independence; and the Byrd amendment,* whereby Congress attempted to circumvent the United Nations boycott of Prime Minister Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia—at least with respect to the importing of chromeite. The pendulum swung upward during the administration of President Jimmy Carter, and this comparison is undoubtedly a factor in the unfavorable assessment of President Reagan's policies and programs today.

Defenders of the Reagan administration's efforts in Africa insist—to use one of President Reagan's favorite expressions—that the administration is "taking a bum rap." It claims that it has still not had time to put its policy initiatives into practice and that, in any event, it has inherited intractable problems. To be charitable, the protest has merit. The Namibian situation, for example, has been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly in one form or another since the first meeting of that body in London in 1946. The war in Chad has been going on for close to two decades, and the multiple civil wars within Ethiopia have dragged on almost as long. To a lesser extent, the same could be said for the wars in Angola and the Western Sahara.

At least privately, moreover, the administration would probably accept the burden of the charge that it tends to view African problems not in terms of their full implications for Africa but rather with respect to how they affect the United States in its global strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or in terms of the flow of

*Authored by Senator Harry F. Byrd (Ind., Va.).

Middle East oil or assuring the security of Israel. It can be argued that this is perhaps the way all superpowers tend to act. Certainly the Soviet Union also has priorities with respect to its interests in world regions.

Given their perception of good and evil, the President's defenders go further, insisting that the United States is obliged to concern itself today with the Soviet challenge precisely because both Democratic and Republican American Presidents ignored Soviet expansionist activities in the past. The years since President Reagan's inauguration have witnessed almost a crescendo emphasis on the advantages that the Soviet Union has gained in both nuclear and conventional armaments at the global level and the territorial gains it has made in the oil-rich Middle East, in Southeast Asia, in Central America, and in Africa itself. Twenty-five years ago the West enjoyed a monopoly of influence in sub-Saharan Africa; today, Soviet leaders have entrenched interests in all major regions of the continent. Soviet interests, moreover, parallel those of Libya's Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, who uses that country's vast oil reserves to subsidize insurgency not only across Africa but in areas ranging as far away as the Philippines and Northern Ireland. Hence—the argument goes—the Reagan administration is compelled to deal with "the world's most dangerous man" in terms of global strategy.

The Reagan administration similarly defends its record of economic assistance to Africa in both absolute and relative terms. As Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, pointed out in late 1982, the administration has requested \$840 million in economic aid for Africa for fiscal 1983, the highest level ever recommended by an American President. This sum is in addition to the quadrupling of United States refugee assistance and emergency food aid over the 1978 level, bringing that figure to \$110 million for fiscal 1982. The United States, furthermore, continues its commitment to the World Bank and the African Development Bank and Fund and provides the means whereby the International Monetary Fund has been able to assist in loans to African and other third world countries. Through these and other multilateral efforts, the total United States economic assistance to Africa in 1982 was well in excess of \$1 billion. While this is considerably less than the contribution of the West Europeans, it is considerably more than the economic—as opposed to military—assistance provided by the Soviet Union to Africa.¹

In other respects as well, the economic and social problems that the United States is expected to address in Africa as part of the "North-South" dialogue are much more serious today than they were during previous administrations. Two-thirds of the 40 or so least

developed states identified by the World Bank are located in Africa. Even the discovery of oil and mineral resources in an African state merely disguises the problems of poverty and the lack of distributive justice because it provides a deceptively improved gross domestic product (GDP). Each year, fewer and fewer African states are able to feed their own populations, let alone have a surplus for export. Conservatively, only six or seven are self-sufficient in food production.

Natural causes as well as human action contribute to making drought a recurrent phenomenon around the continent. The number of refugees created by drought, however, pales in contrast with the number who have been forced within the last three or four years to uproot themselves as a consequence of war or domestic political strife, in the Horn of Africa, the Western Sahara, the Sudan, Angola, Namibia, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi. In October, 1982, there were an estimated 1.5 million African refugees, supported in part by United States government funds and American donor agencies.

The least developed countries face continual problems in meeting OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) prices in paying their fuel bills. This situation is compounded by the decline in demand for African raw material exports that comes as a consequence of the recession in the United States and the West. This means that the AID (Agency for International Development) dollars cannot be stretched so far. The United States government and the American banking community, moreover, are increasingly being asked both directly and through international agencies to bail out African countries on the verge of bankruptcy.

Finally, with respect to Africa's most explosive problem area—southern Africa—the administration's supporters claim that this administration is doing no worse than its predecessors. One example is the continuing of the policy of non-recognition of the Marxist MPLA (Angola Popular Liberation Movement) government in Angola that characterized the administrations of President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. In some cases, American and other Western governments and private investors and businessmen have increased their involvement in the states to the north of the Republic of South Africa. Even in socialist Angola and Mozambique, there is a discernible trend in favor of Americans, West Germans, and even Portuguese. The Westerners are replacing Eastern bloc technicians and parastatal efforts in developing resources and in maintaining ports and other infrastructure.

President Reagan has given strong economic backing to Zimbabwe, which most observers regard as the key to the development of the nine states in the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). SADCC is a regional organization that seeks to liberate the nine states, plus Zaire, from the eco-

¹Chester Crocker, "Africa: Economic Prospects and Problems," United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Current Policy*, no. 422 (September 17, 1982).

nomic stranglehold that South Africa exercises over the region's transport, mining, and flow of labor. The Reagan administration used its good offices to pressure the South Africans to restore Zimbabwe's preferential trade status, which had been eliminated after independence. Both on a bilateral basis and through SADCC, the administration has helped countries in the region to rationalize transport and meet their food needs.

With respect to one of the specific crises in the southern region—the armed struggle for Namibian independence—the Reagan administration insists that it has worked vigorously with the other members of the Western contact groups (Great Britain, France, West Germany and Canada) in pressing the South Africans to the negotiating table. Negotiating progress has been made in setting up a framework for discussion of constitutional arrangements, the cease-fire, the schedule of elections, the qualification of the participants in the election, international supervision, and the withdrawal of South African military and administrative personnel.

Chester Crocker and other American negotiators have convinced themselves that "quiet diplomacy" can be more effective in achieving the ultimate goal than constant posturing in the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, which seems to force the Afrikaaners to adopt their traditional siege mentality. Indeed, few can challenge Crocker's indefatigable efforts in working the corridors of the United Nations, engaging in shuttle diplomacy across southern Africa, and proposing solutions that can be perceived as mutually beneficial to all parties. Like many of his predecessors, Chester Crocker has found that the problems of southern Africa virtually monopolize the critical attention that he should give to the subcontinent. Unlike many predecessors, however, he has had extensive personal and professional experience with the area.

Unfortunately, it is precisely the pursuit of solutions to problems in southern Africa that has led to the criticism of the Reagan record in Africa. At the end of 1982, it was charged, the stalled Namibian negotiations constituted a decided setback for Namibian independence. They also disappointed those who were seeking additional pressure toward dismantling the superstructures of apartheid that discriminate against the more than 80 percent of the population of South Africa that is non-white. Of perhaps equal significance, the administration's approach to southern African problems has alienated the other countries of Africa that Americans regard as friendly to the United States and upon whom we depend for oil and other minerals and military bases.

Indeed, the southern African policies of this and every other American government have become virtually a litmus test to judge the sincerity of American

intentions in Africa. The somewhat mixed reception that was accorded United States Vice President George Bush during his November, 1982, African sojourn provided evidence of that. President Shehu Shagari and other leaders of Nigeria—a country that is second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of meeting United States foreign oil needs—made public their displeasure at our Namibian policies. So also did President Daniel arap-Moi of Kenya, which has been a strong ally of the United States and provides berthing rights and other facilities in Mombasa Harbor for the United States Rapid Deployment Force. The Frontline States (Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), many of which are significant sources of strategic minerals, are particularly incensed by the negative consequences of American initiatives in Namibia.

To a certain extent, the Reagan policies in southern Africa are victims of comparison. The Carter administration, which had abandoned the posture of "benign neglect" toward African liberation, pursued a vigorous course of action with respect to Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa itself. Regardless of the assessment of the Carter policies in Iran or elsewhere, his administration's policies with respect to southern Africa undoubtedly gave the United States its best image in Africa since official relationships developed in the 1950's. Partly, of course, this was a matter of style and perception.

In contrast, the rhetoric of the past two years has constituted a decided setback to America's leadership role in southern Africa. Much of the fault rests with the President himself. African leaders have told this writer that they find it unbelievable that President Reagan is trying to retain a strong United States negotiating role by appearing to remain neutral or even-handed in dealing with South Africa and its opponents. "How," they ask, "can the leader of a nation that is still engaged in overcoming the consequences of centuries of racial strife remain neutral with respect to apartheid?" They point out that President Reagan is not equally neutral in mounting diplomatic, economic and even military campaigns against the terrorism of Colonel Qaddafi. As they see it, the President's comments in his celebrated interview with Walter Cronkite in March, 1981, went beyond neutrality. He asserted that the American public finds it difficult to turn its back on South Africa—"a country that has stood beside us in every war we've ever fought." Many observers found in this statement both misplaced sympathy and distorted history; many South African leaders are descended from the very Afrikaaners who refused to fight the Nazis in World War II.

More important, the Carter and Reagan records differ with respect to substance. Under President Carter, Congress repealed the Byrd amendment relating to the importing of chromite from Rhodesia.

This signaled the United States intentions to be more vigorous in observing the United Nations boycott and to commence negotiations with other Western bloc leaders. The United States pressed the Ian Smith regime and its supporter in Pretoria with regard to the need for majority rule elections in Rhodesia. Despite the harassment from ultra-right Senators and Congressmen, the Carter government steadfastly refused to recognize the puppet regime of Bishop Abel Muzorewa after the phony 1979 elections. This led to the Lancaster House Conference of December, 1979, which produced the Zimbabwe independence formula.

At that time, the American initiative (along with that of other Western powers) brought the Pretoria regime to the conference table for the first time to discuss the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435 regarding the independence of Namibia. Thus the Namibian issue appeared to be at last heading toward a solution, having been a source of continual international conflict since the 1946 decision of South Africa not to place the Southwest Africa Mandate Territory under the United Nations Trusteeship System. Under President Carter, moreover, American leaders were even able to approach the discussion of political, social and economic reform in South Africa itself.

In anticipation of President Reagan's 1980 victory, the South African leaders began to drag their heels in terms of further concessions on Namibia and on internal change. They have indeed found that the new administration's actions match the President's more sympathetic words. During President Reagan's first year, the State Department under Secretary Alexander Haig repeatedly asked the Congress to repeal the 1976 Clark Amendment,** which forbade American support to insurgency groups in Angola. The United States Republican Senate was receptive on this request, and Jonas Savimbi of UNITA (the National Union for Total Angolan Independence) was given a most cordial semiofficial welcome to the United States. But the Democratic House of Representatives refused to approve the repeal. Haig's recommendation was viewed in most African quarters as an offensive gesture towards the MPLA government in Angola, which is recognized by most states in the world—including all our European allies. It also seemed to signal the South Africans that they would not suffer any reprimand from Washington regarding their destabilizing efforts in southern Africa. South Africa was acknowledged as the primary military supporter of UNITA in Angola, the National Resistance Movement in Mozambique, and other insurgent groups. The apparent absence of American neutrality was also clear in the exchanges of military visits between the United States and South

Africa, the United States sale of cattle prods for South African riot control, and the relaxation of licensing restrictions on military technology vis-à-vis South Africa. The most blatant abandonment of neutrality, however, came with the solitary American veto in August, 1981, of the United Nations Security Council's resolution condemning the South African raid into Angola in search of guerrillas of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO). More recently, the International Monetary Fund's \$1.1-billion loan to South Africa—which had the prior approval of the United States—was viewed by many African leaders as support both for the economic structures of apartheid and for South Africa's military operations in Namibia. Continental leaders were equally upset when Vice President Bush explained (on his November, 1982, African sojourn) that the loan was a way of "seeking constructive relations and building bridges of communication" with South Africa as a way of eliminating apartheid.

The final straw, however, in undermining the charade of neutrality came in the Reagan administration's efforts to link Namibian independence with the withdrawal of all the estimated 20,000 Cuban troops from Angola. Although American officials attempted to present this as a constructive South African negotiating card to which the United States had eagerly responded, it was clear that the initiative came from Chester Crocker and others.² Whatever the origins of the idea, Angola and the other Frontline States regarded it as offensive. It ignored the fact that the Cubans had been invited into Angola by the MPLA government and were there to protect the country from both UNITA and South African military attack. The linkage issue also demonstrated the Reagan administration's willingness to place a far higher priority on the global confrontation with the Soviet Union and the worry about Cuban militarism than on the interests of Africans in liberation and self-defense. The Cuban linkage ploy had far greater meaning in domestic politics in South Africa and in the United States. The removal of Cuban troops, it was argued, might make it possible for Prime Minister Pieter Botha of South Africa to persuade the right wing in his own party and the recently defected Treurnicht group to consent to withdrawal from Namibia. If the Cubans left, the loss of Namibia would not jeopardize South Africa's security. Similarly, President Reagan might be able to placate both the military zealots and the covert racists in the American right wing of his own party by demonstrating that the negotiations had met some of the United States global objectives. Whatever the rationale, it was clear at the end of 1982 that the Cuban troop linkage issue had virtually paralyzed the negotiations over Namibian independence and had given South Africa another diplomatic victory and more stalling time.

**Authored by Senator Richard Clark (D., Iowa).

²See Crocker, "Namibia/Angola Linkages," *Africa Report*, vol. 26, no. 6 (November-December, 1981), p. 10.

Beyond what many regard as misguided optimism on the issue of racial harmony, President Reagan's supporters advance two other justifications for giving a lesser priority to the human rights issue in South Africa and Namibia. The first of these has to do with the strategic location of South Africa astride the sea lane route between the sources of oil in the Middle East and the Western powers (see the map on the inside back cover of this issue). The extended closure of the Suez Canal after the Six Day War in 1967 as well as the inability of the large oil tankers to negotiate the narrow canal has restored the Cape route to its earlier position of importance to global commerce and warfare. Hence, military advisers in the Reagan administration caution that the West's oil lifelines would be threatened if the port facilities of South Africa, Mozambique or Angola were controlled by a regime subservient to the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, in our strategic interests—so the argument goes—to support an avowedly anti-Communist regime in spite of its oppressive racial policies, rather than risk not knowing the real intentions of a successor regime.

The sea-lanes argument has many pitfalls. First, in strictly strategic terms, the navies of the United States and other Western powers have not had to depend on the port facilities of South Africa for almost 15 years. Every NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) power has found it politically expedient to avoid port calls at Cape Town or Durban. Moreover, the threat posed by hostile control of southern African ports assumes a state of war. In that eventuality, Western oil tankers coming from the Persian Gulf would undoubtedly be threatened by Soviet submarines operating from bases much closer to the source of that oil. Control of Maputo or Durban would be redundant. Finally, the argument assumes that African regimes that have only recently received their independence would give a blank check to the Soviet Union with respect to the use of their territory in the event of a superpower conflict. While it is true that Somalia and other countries have military understandings with superpowers, they would be reluctant to be pawns in a global war. The expulsion of Soviet military missions from Egypt, the Sudan, Guinea, Burundi, and Somalia is evidence that no African state yet has become a full-fledged satellite of the Soviet Union. Even Angola and Ethiopia can apparently order the removal of Cuban, Soviet and other forces from their territory if the occasion demands it.

The second reason given for a lower priority for human rights in South Africa is the United States need for strategic minerals. In his confirmation hearings in 1980, Secretary Alexander Haig noted that "the era of resource war [has] already begun." In his 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, President Reagan also stressed the importance of the mineral wealth of South Africa. It is asserted that not only the military needs

but also the health of the industrial economies of the West and Japan require that the United States has continued access to key minerals needed for the manufacture of high grade steel, for the production of jet engines, for anti-pollution devices, and the other products that maintain the technologically advanced Western industrial societies. By the accidents of geography and geology, South Africa and neighbor states as far north as Zaire possess a substantial share of the world's known deposits of cobalt, manganese, platinum, palladium, chromite, vanadium, antimony, industrial diamonds, uranium and tin. All these are vital to today's advanced technology. South Africa, moreover, contains a substantial share of the world's gold reserves which, for reasons not altogether logical, are linked with the health of the global economy.

These facts have recently led observers to term southern Africa the "Persian Gulf" of the mineral world. That analogy, incidentally, is not limited to the concentration of minerals; it is also related to the concern that someday the analogy of the OPEC experience (OPEC's control over production and pricing of oil) could drive up the price of African minerals or limit their production or availability to the West. What particularly concerns military and industrial planners in the United States is that the second or third alternative source for at least three of these minerals—platinum, vanadium and chromite—is the Soviet Union.

Most of those who think in terms of mineral strategies focus on South Africa, because it virtually controls the main transport lines from mineral-rich Zambia, Zimbabwe, Zaire and Botswana; and South Africans own or control the management of mines and/or the marketing of the minerals leaving the region. South Africa, moreover, has developed the technological skills and personnel upon whom the neighboring black states depend for the exploitation of their own mineral wealth.

The first option for the United States would be to work toward the maintenance of political stability in southern Africa, so that there would be no interruption of production and transport of these minerals. A corollary of this is that the United States should avoid offending the present regime in Pretoria out of fear that it might unilaterally deny these minerals to the West by limiting production or preventing the devel-

(Continued on page 133)

J. Gus Liebenow is the author of many scholarly works, including *Liberia: the Evolution of Privilege* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969) and *Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971). He is past president of the African Studies Association, a member of the Executive Council of the International African Institute (London), and founding director of the African Studies Program at Indiana University.

In Kenya, "the hidden agenda of the past year's political maneuvering has been the issue of Moi's continued leadership. . . . That Moi has carefully read the mood of the nation is evident from his actions; that these actions are contradictory is a reflection of the contradictions inherent in Kenya's political and economic life."

Kenya's Year of Discontent

BY PATRICIA STAMP

Assistant Professor in Social Science, York University

EXTOLLED as one of the third world's politically most stable and economically most progressive nations, Kenya saw its reputation undermined in 1982 by an attempted coup and by the rapid deterioration of its economy. On August 1, 1981, junior members of the air force briefly seized control of the state broadcasting headquarters and two air bases. With the spontaneous participation of university students, they marched on downtown Nairobi, triggering several hours of looting and violence around the city before loyal army troops and police restored order. In its brief moment in the spotlight, the rebels' self-styled "People's Redemption Committee" accused the government of "a ruthless repression reminiscent of the colonial days."

The short, chaotic uprising took place in the context of an alarming disintegration of economic well-being. Export earnings declined 6 percent between 1980 and 1981, despite an increase in the volume of exports. A balance of payments deficit of \$300 million to \$400 million was estimated for 1981—up from about \$270 million in 1981—even though imports declined.¹ The bill for imported cereals was 74 percent higher in 1981

¹Kenya had a trade surplus of about \$200 million in 1979. The 1982 *Economic Survey* reported that "the balance of payments problem has now reached major proportions," and that this would be the major barrier to economic development over the next few years.

²A major problem was that the government's need to borrow to cover its dramatically increased costs starved the private sector of capital. Expenditures for public administration, agriculture and debt servicing required a 77-percent increase in government borrowing in fiscal 1981-1982, which was financed by external grants and loans, long-term domestic loans, and an increased issue of Treasury bills. The cost of overseas borrowing—about 17 percent for Eurodollars in June, 1982—meant that the government had to rely heavily on the local banking system. As a result, credit to the private sector increased by only 10 percent. See the summary of the budget, and economic survey for 1981-1982 in *Weekly Review* (Kenya), June 18, 1982.

³See Patricia Stamp, "Kenya: The Echoing Footsteps," *Current History*, March, 1982, for a discussion of the crisis surrounding the succession of power on Kenyatta's death, and the strategies adopted by President Moi to cope with ongoing political problems.

than the average for the previous two years, while coffee sold for 50 percent less in real terms than it did during the boom year of 1977. Inflation was running at about 20 percent. For the first time, Kenya had to go hat in hand to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for emergency funds to keep the economy afloat.²

Kenya's stability and prosperity were once overplayed by Western observers; but its current problems should not be interpreted superficially.³ The coup attempt was not a political disaster: there was no coherent, powerful anti-government organization behind it. Nor is Kenya's economic problem so severe as that facing other African countries. Its gross domestic product rose by almost 5 percent in 1981, in the face of an overall decline in per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa (a strong recovery in Kenya's agricultural production was a significant feature in 1982). The country's problems should be understood as a sharpening and unfolding of some long-standing contradictions in its political and economic life.

The problems of President Daniel arap Moi's succession to power have reemerged in new forms. Moi must continue to manage the rivalry for power among his powerful Kikuyu allies while retaining their support; at the same time, he must cope with the ambitions of non-Kikuyu who want their turn at power and influence. He must achieve these conflicting tasks against a background of increasingly vociferous activism among Kenya's straitened middle classes. The airmen's revolt was merely the most dramatic of a series of political confrontations during the past year. The solutions that were devised to cope with political dissent only exacerbated it, leading to more drastic measures and, one could argue, to the coup attempt itself. The revolt, in turn, served as a justification for the regime's further suppression of dissent.

But Kenya's very stability and success have rested on the democratic ideals and the producing and consuming vigor of the middle classes, and any government must tread carefully in moving to restrict them or to hinder their economic interests. The government's higher echelons include a substantial portion of

the wealthy upper classes, who are often in alliance with foreign capital against indigenous business interests. Thus, the government is faced with the task of fostering healthy home-grown capitalism while at the same time there is a strong impetus in its own ranks to favor international capital.⁴

Moreover, international financial institutions have made crucial aid contingent on Kenya's maintaining an open door to multinational corporations and unrestricted trade. The fulfillment of this obligation also acts against the interests of the Kenyan government's middle class support base. Thus, Moi's moves to tame middle class dissent are accompanied by actions to appease the citizenry. Populist policies, like a war on "magendo" (illegal economic acts), go hand in hand with repressive measures, like the increasing use of detention against middle class intellectuals and politicians.

The monetary policies introduced by the developed countries to control inflation have also taken their toll, principally in the areas of credit and of export trade. Like other developing countries, Kenya is dependent on export and is therefore vulnerable to international price fluctuations. The overall trend since independence has been towards worsening terms of trade; and 1982 saw a dramatic acceleration of this trend. Coffee, Kenya's most important crop, is headed for a production collapse because of the soaring cost of essential imported inputs like fertilizers and pesticides. The result is a drop in vital foreign exchange earnings. Even if Kenya produces adequate supplies of coffee for export, it finds itself in a double bind: the World Coffee Marketing Organization has imposed a strict quota on the amount the country is allowed to export.⁵

Kenya's combined economic and political dilemmas are not unique. The dual crisis facing capitalism and democracy relates to the underdeveloped form of cap-

⁴See *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 17, January-April, 1980, and no. 19, September-December, 1980, for a debate on the degree of Kenya's dependence on international capitalist interests.

⁵There is also inefficiency in the Kenya Coffee Board, which markets the product. Small growers have suffered delayed payments for their crop; the Kenya Coffee Growers Association agitated during the year for the Board's abolition.

⁶See Mahmoud Mamdani, *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), for documentation of this point in the context of colonial policy in Uganda and the British textile industry.

Eduardo Galeano develops this thesis in the context of Latin America: see *The Open Veins of Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), p. 230. A forceful statistical corroboration of the state's centrality in capitalist enterprise is the Kenyan government's calculation that government expenditure was about one-third of the GDP in 1981-1982 (*Weekly Review*, June 18, 1982).

⁷The Kenya Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Public Service Structure and Remuneration of 1971 (the so-called Ndegwa Report, which had a considerable impact on government policy regarding the civil service), officially sanctioned civil servants' pursuit of private business interests.

italism in Africa today (including its ties to the developed capitalism of the West) and to the part played by the state in African political economy. From their beginnings, the governments set up by the former colonial powers had a mandate to direct economic development, with the course of this development determined by the industrial and marketing needs of the mother country.⁶ African countries inherited these interventionist structures at independence. Each stage of capitalist growth, from the development of commodity production to the setting up of light industry to the promotion of multinational corporate activity, has been directed by the state in partnership with foreign private interests. In fact, the "spirit of enterprise," which in the West characterized the entrepreneurial class during industrialization was, in the absence of such a class, a characteristic of the state itself in Africa.⁷

As a consequence, African governments have been central actors in the development of internal, political class-divisions. They have developed huge bureaucracies and a myriad of parastatal organizations to cope with their central role in capitalist enterprise, and they have also become a primary route of individual economic advancement. A civil service salary represents entry into the middle class, while senior political and administrative positions offer access to large-scale business enterprise.⁸

THE LIMITS TO ACTION

Only limited courses of action are open to Kenya. The country is economically committed to capitalist development; yet capitalism in its underdeveloped form poses insuperable barriers to genuine indigenous development. There are huge strains on the democratic process; but there are constraints on the regime's use of repression as well. In the social realm, ethnic unity is as elusive as ever, but pursuit of ethnic advantage—either by those in power or by those in opposition—is also a limited option.

Seen against these limitations, the events of 1982 come into sharper focus. The middle classes emerge at the center of the stage, providing the principal challenge to the regime, and at the same time constituting its political, social and economic mainstays. Political conflict has been conducted not in the language of revolutionary challenge, but through quintessentially populist, middle class interests. Middle class actors have come forward to act as challengers or defenders of the status quo. The truly privileged have reacted rather than acted.

Moi himself embodies the contradiction: as a member of the state apparatus and the upper classes he is a target of middle class dissent, but as head of state and the symbol of Kenyan unity he is essential to middle class interests, the defender of stability and order, and the dispenser of the material resources on which they depend. For his own part, dissent is a threat Moi

must manage, but alliance with middle class forces is also imperative in view of the power moves taking place in the upper reaches of the political elite.

By the beginning of 1982, the President's "philosophy" of *Nyayoism* had apparently played itself out as an ideological force for national cohesion. *Nyayo*, the Swahili word for "footsteps," was the slogan through which Moi had legitimized his presidency, which he said followed in Jomo Kenyatta's footsteps.⁸ Increasingly, *Nyayoism* referred to Moi's rather than Kenyatta's authority and was used to justify sometimes repressive action in the name of national unity. But by the end of 1981, the slogan's coinage was debased by the tendency for different political factions to shout accusations of anti-*Nyayoism*. The waning of *Nyayoism* was perhaps symptomatic of the limits on Moi's mediating powers in Kenyan politics—powers which (as a member of the Kalenjin, a minority ethnic group) he had wielded fairly effectively. In any event, the co-optation of *Nyayoism* by Moi's senior rivals for power signaled the end of Moi's consensus.

The lead actors in the political chess game were Mwai Kibaki, Vice President and Minister of Finance, and Charles Njonjo, former Attorney General and then Minister for Constitutional and Home Affairs. These two veteran Kikuyu statesmen had formed a triumvirate with Moi in the sensitive time before and after Kenyatta's death, when the Kiambu Kikuyu "family" of Kenyatta supporters sought to block Moi's accession to the presidency from his position as Vice President. By 1980, it had become evident that Kibaki and Njonjo had become rivals, not only in maneuvers to fill the vacuum felt by the political eclipse of the "family," but for wider loyalties among non-Kikuyu as well. Kibaki's strength was his stalwart following among northern Kikuyu and, increasingly, among the Kiambu in the south. Njonjo, himself a Kiambu man, has never had broad political appeal, although he has been highly effective in constituency politics since his election as a member of Parliament in 1980. His success lay in his consummate political strategy, which established his reputation as a respected elder statesman and a forceful leader in national political issues. The tactician behind the defense of Moi's constitutional position in the days of the succession, he became Moi's closest adviser.

Neither man had been an active grassroots politician, and it was probably for this reason that they were acceptable to Moi as political allies in his struggle to secure the succession. But in the second half of 1981, both shed their aloof image and actively participated in local politics, energetically raising funds for *Haram-*

⁸The shuffle saw several other politicians moved out of the President's inner orbit. G.G. Kariuki and Nicholas Biwott, both Ministers of State in the Office of the President who had benefited politically from this close association, were given portfolios in other ministries.

ambee (self-help development) projects all over the country. In directing their political energies directly to the public rather than through Moi, they both appeared to be asserting their independent political stature vis-à-vis the President. Further, their ventures beyond Kikuyuland could be seen as an encroachment on Moi's monopoly of panethnic loyalty.

It is important to see Kibaki and Njonjo not simply as "movers and shakers" in their own right but as representatives of a faction of Kenya's upper classes. They were not only the statesmanlike voices of "rational," progressive government but the guardians of the technocratic elite that gained its economic position in the Kenyatta years. This faction of the elite runs the government and parastatal organizations and acts in the interests of international capital. Kibaki and Njonjo thus stood against both the rambunctious Kenyatta "family," and the new non-Kikuyu elite that was seeking to replace it.

Moi therefore found himself in early 1982 with a threadbare slogan of unity and a loosening ruling alliance. It is not surprising that he moved to distance himself from both allies and sought more forceful means than the carrot of *Nyayoism*'s "peace, love and unity" in his attempt to manage the centrifugal tendencies emerging in Kenyan politics. The suspension of *Harambee* functions early in the year was one part of his new strategy. The ostensible reason was that *Harambee* was out of control. Funds had been misappropriated; coercive methods of collection were being used; and there were questions as to the source of politicians' contributions. But the suspension also served to remove the chief arena of political grandstanding on the part of local and national politicians alike.

A second part of Moi's strategy involved a Cabinet reshuffle in February, in which Kibaki was demoted from the Finance Ministry, and Home Affairs was removed from Njonjo's ministry, leaving him with the shrunken portfolio of Constitutional Affairs. To complete the rearrangement, Kibaki was put in charge of a new Ministry of Home Affairs.⁹ The Cabinet reshuffle was explained as a move to increase efficiency, particularly in the management of the beleaguered economy, over which Kibaki had presided for a number of years. Both Kibaki and Njonjo appeared to have been demoted in the process, but in fact over the next several months Njonjo apparently retained much of his power. While his efforts to win over the Kiambu old guard had had little impact, he forged alliances with leaders from Moi's Rift Valley Province (several of whom also gained in the Cabinet reshuffle). Thus Kibaki and the technocratic Kikuyu elite whose chief representative he was seemed to have lost out (a reflection, perhaps, of their weak and peripheral political position).

The rivalry at the top that Moi was seeking to con-

trol was not an isolated phenomenon but was intimately connected to jockeying for power at all levels of politics. Kibaki and Njonjo found it as difficult as Moi to curb the enthusiasm of parliamentary back-benchers, local politicians, media representatives and intellectuals. These groups increasingly voiced their frustration at corruption in high places. In February, Moi launched an attack on corruption—specifically, currency smuggling by Asian businessmen—but by March the cry against corruption was taken up among a broad section of the Kenyan elite, including those in government and in other areas of public life, like the members of the cooperative movement.

The surge of middle class political activism was overtly connected to maneuvering in preparation for the overdue elections in the ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU).¹⁰ But it was also a response to increasing economic hardship and a sense that the political elite had eroded its legitimacy by accumulating wealth at the expense of ordinary Kenyans, at a time when they could least afford such subsidization. Moi's strategy to rein in the elite through his attack on corruption was co-opted by the anti-government activism that followed.

Events moved fast after March, 1982. Oginga Odinga, returning like Halley's Comet to Kenya's political fray, claimed that the government's IMF-dictated economic policies were causing misery among ordinary Kenyans. Because it was Odinga who took up the left-wing challenge, Luo opposition was once more raised as a political specter. Odinga was expelled from KANU, and he and several of his supporters were detained. It was a reprise of 1969, when Kenyatta, by adroit political maneuvering, transformed a broad, Kikuyu-supported radical challenge to his regime into the appearance of a Luo insurgency. By banning the Luo-dominated opposition party, the Kenya People's Union, and incarcerating Odinga, Kenyatta had effectively stifled left-wing dissent and disarmed his Kikuyu opposition.

The similarities to 1969 were increased when Odinga and his supporters moved in April to found a new opposition party of the "peasantry, workers and the proletariat," to be named the Kenya Socialist party. Odinga himself was widely regarded as a political relic, prone to inappropriately inflammatory rhetoric. But the call for a left-wing opposition party struck a strong chord among the diverse middle class opposition; and a group of left-wing university scholars appeared willing to take up the cause. The challenge was considered sufficiently serious to warrant an amendment to the constitution, making Kenya a one party state de jure

¹⁰The last elections were held in 1978, and by the KANU constitution were due by the end of 1980. In November, 1981, Moi postponed them until after the termination of his OAU chairmanship in June, 1982. Events in the OAU, and the coup attempt, postponed them once again.

as well as de facto. The amendment was passed by Parliament shortly after Odinga's detention. In the course of passage of the one-party bill, the vocal back-benchers who had taken up the cry against privilege at the top fell silent.

No sooner had the "Luo factor" and the back-bench challenge been dealt with than opposition sprang up in another quarter. Through May and June, government anxiety was fueled by the appearance of "seditious" anti-government pamphlets and by increasing student criticism of government policies. While there was no evidence of outside instigation, the government railed against foreign-influenced subversive activity. And although Kenya has a long tradition of student activism, a number of students and lecturers were detained.

Student criticism of the government was toned down after the detentions, and even Odinga, who had been released, did not speak out. But in mid-July, criticism of the government came from yet another quarter, this time an unexpected one. The editor of the staunchly pro-government *Standard*, George Githii, created a furor by attacking the detention policies as unconstitutional. Githii was fired, and the university was closed down in response to renewed student criticism and a demonstration.

THE COUP ATTEMPT AND ITS AFTERMATH

The abortive coup on August 1, which drew a new actor—a branch of the armed forces—onto the stage, was thus not so much a startling alteration of Kenya's political direction as it was the most dramatic of a series of confrontations in 1982 between the middle classes and the government. After a few days of fear and uncertainty, much of it caused by the violence of the looting mob in Nairobi, the country was once again remarkably normal. The uprising involved predominantly junior officers; few senior officers appear to have been involved. Nonetheless, the entire air force was disbanded. (An estimated 250 men were killed during the uprising. About 1,500 were detained.) The task of reorganizing the force was put in the hands of Major General Mahmoud Mohammed, the deputy army commander and an ethnic Somali, who had been responsible for suppressing the coup attempt.

In late 1982, the exact nature and extent of the plot were still unclear. After mid-September, the events surrounding the uprising emerged like a soap opera serial, as the press reported on the open court martials

(Continued on page 126)

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"Zimbabwe's economic success is of considerable importance to the other black nations of southern Africa and to the blacks of South Africa as well. Zimbabwe has the transportation network, the communications facilities and the potential to serve as the region's economic hub."

The Social and Economic Transformation of Zimbabwe

BY VIRGINIA CURTIN KNIGHT
Consulting Editor, Current History

DURING the third year of majority rule in Zimbabwe, economic conditions and political divisions emerged as the major concerns of the new government. Nationwide elections in 1980 brought Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to power. With 57 seats in the 100-member Parliament, ZANU-PF defeated Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), which won 20 seats, and Bishop Abel Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC), which won 3 seats. Under the constitution, 20 seats are reserved for whites for 10 years; the Republican Front (formerly the Rhodesian Front) led by former Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith took the 20 seats reserved for whites. Eleven members of the Republican Front have since bolted and become Independents, often voting with the majority.

ZANU-PF has no strong opposition in Parliament, although there is argument within the party over the pace of reform and the route to take toward establishing a socialist state. Minister of Home Affairs Herbert Ushewokunze, former Minister of Health, is among the most outspoken of those wishing to hasten change.

Political dissatisfaction is expressed openly in Parliament by members of ZAPU and the Republican Front. But it is the actions of political opponents in Matabeleland that have caused government concern and have brought worldwide attention to Zimbabwe. Matabeleland is the southern region of Zimbabwe where the Ndebele people live. The Ndebele make up about 16 percent of the nation's 7.5 million people; the Shona-speakers in the north and northeastern regions make up about 70 percent. Nkomo's ZAPU receives most of its support from the Ndebele. Over the last year, events have further alienated ZANU-PF supporters from ZAPU supporters, exacerbating the bad blood between the two parties and their leaders.

Domestic unrest in Matabeleland and South African attempts to destabilize Zimbabwe's government and economy have taken public attention away from the government's economic and social programs. Ninety years of white minority rule created extreme social and economic imbalances between whites and blacks. Distortions created by minority rule are evident in land distribution, access to educational and health facilities, wages and housing, and neglect of the black rural areas. The Zimbabwe government is committed to redressing these imbalances, but its ability to do so is limited by its economic wherewithal.

THE ECONOMY

In 1980 the nine black African states of southern Africa—Botswana, Malawi, Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia—formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to strengthen economic relations among themselves and to reduce their economic dependence on South Africa. For most of these countries, however, economic independence from South Africa is a long way off. Of all the states in Africa, and especially in southern Africa, South Africa has the market and transportation systems lacking in the black African states. Zambia, one of the SADCC countries, has suspended all imports because it has no foreign currency to pay for them.

South Africa is Zimbabwe's principal trading partner. In 1981, Zimbabwe's exports totaled \$1.2 billion,* with \$249.8 million or 21 percent going to South Africa. Zimbabwe's imports totaled \$1.5 billion, with \$363 million (27.5 percent) coming from South Africa.¹

Zimbabwe's other major trading partners are the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany. Its major exports are tobacco, gold, asbestos, cotton, and other minerals and foodstuffs. During the first half of 1982, exports of gold, tobacco and asbestos were well below 1981 levels, while imports for the same period increased by almost 22 percent. In 1981, for the first time since 1968, Zimbabwe had a trade deficit,

*All monetary figures are in US\$ (Z\$1 = US\$1.30).

¹Monthly Digest of Statistics (Harare: Central Statistical Office, September, 1982), pp. 16-17.

attributable in part to the decline in the price of gold. The overall trade deficit for 1981 was \$90.3 million, and the 1982 prospects are even bleaker.²

In July, 1982, the International Monetary Fund reported that Zimbabwe had net foreign reserves of \$138 million, sufficient reserves for two months. Minister of Finance Bernard Chidzero announced additional cuts in foreign exchange allocations and he further reduced holiday and business allowances for those traveling outside Zimbabwe.[†]

Zimbabwe's critical shortage of foreign currency limits the amount and types of imports, which are already restricted to items basic to manufacturing and agriculture. In 1981, imports totaled \$1.15 billion; and of this amount, \$272.2 million went for the purchase of petroleum and energy-related products; \$425 million went for the purchase of machinery of all types, spare parts and transport equipment. However, as limits are placed on imports, fewer processed and manufactured goods are available for export.³

To reduce its energy import bill from Zambia (which provides Zimbabwe with 40 percent of its electric consumption), the government is partly funding the second stage of the Wankie coal-fueled electric power project. The project will eventually save the country \$26 million in foreign exchange.

In 1982, the tourist industry, another source of foreign exchange, suffered because of the worldwide publicity that followed the violence in two major tourist areas, Victoria Falls and Inyanga, in the Eastern Highlands. In July, six tourists were kidnapped on the road from Victoria Falls to Bulawayo (by early December they had not been found) and in Inyanga, three British tourists were murdered. In August, 1982, there were 6,000 fewer visitors than in the previous August. In the first eight months of 1982, the total number of tourists dropped by 4,000. Despite the discouraging year, a Holiday Inn is under construction in Harare (formerly Salisbury), the capital, and plans are under way for the construction of a five-star, 298 double-room hotel and conference center in Harare.

In September, in an effort to attract foreign investment, the government issued an investment code, spelling out guarantees on disinvestment and the amount of profit that companies will be allowed to repatriate. Initially, the government insisted that the constitution provided adequate protection against the confiscation of property and profits. However, no for-

eign investment was forthcoming and it was not until the investment code was issued that the Pittsburgh-based H. J. Heinz Corporation and the government announced that Heinz would buy (for \$30 million) a 51-percent share of the locally owned Olivine Company, a producer of cooking oils and margarine, and that the government would buy the remaining shares.

A foreign company's acquisition of a locally owned company that produces basic consumer items seems to contradict government announcements of its intention to establish a socialist country. Seventy percent of the economy is already foreign owned, primarily by British and South African companies, and some government critics argue that foreign investment should be limited to areas like high technology, where there is no alternative to foreign investment.⁴

From the Rhodesian government of Prime Minister Ian Smith (1964-1979), the Mugabe regime inherited a commodity marketing board system by which the government subsidized crop production and food prices. For the fiscal year ending June, 1982, the government spent \$209.3 million underwriting the cost of cooking oil, bread, milk, mealie meal and some other consumer goods. As a prelude to fulfilling its pledge to phase out the subsidy system, the government established industry-wide minimum wages. Previously, workers received subsistence wages of \$10 to \$12 a month and some food. The government set minimum wages for domestic workers at \$39 a month and subsequently raised them to \$67 a month. Industrial workers initially received \$110 a month and were raised to \$136 a month. Withdrawal of some of the subsidies, coupled with increased consumer purchasing power and a freeze on some consumer prices caused some shortages. The government has put a limit on further wage increases, although workers cannot keep up with the 17 percent annual inflation rate.

Although the government is withdrawing subsidies from consumer goods, it is subsidizing the mining industry in order to keep the mines open and workers employed. The Ministry of Mines set aside \$64 million in its 1982-1983 budget for the mining industry.

Since 1980, 177 mines have closed, putting nearly 2,000 miners out of work. In October, 1982, after pressure from the government, Rio Tinto Zimbabwe agreed to accept a \$3.5 million government loan to prevent the closure of its Empress Nickel Mine and the dismissal of almost 1,000 workers.⁵ Nonetheless, on December 29, Rio Tinto announced the closing of the mine. The managing director of the Bindura Nickel corporation, the largest nickel producer in the country, estimated that that company would have a \$13-million loss in 1982, down from an \$18-million profit in 1980 and a nearly \$7-million profit in 1981.

Minister of Mines Maurice Nyagumbo has warned that if mineral prices remain depressed, the country's social and economic development programs will be se-

[†]In December, the government devalued the dollar 20 percent.

²*Executive Guide to the Economy* (Harare: RAL Merchant Bank, Ltd., September, 1982), p. 8.

³*Monthly Digest*.

⁴Colin Stoneman, "We Do Not Need Heinz and Co.," *MOTO*, October, 1982, pp. 50-51.

⁵"Rio to Chalk Up a \$10m Loss," *The Herald* (Harare), November 4, 1982.

verely affected; he has said that the government cannot continue putting money into the mining industry to guarantee employment and at the same time maintain its high level of spending for development.

The government's priority on reconstruction, especially in the rural areas, is embodied in its Public Sector Investment Program (PSIP), which sets "the direction and indeed the pace of economic and social development."⁶ Funding for the public sector investment program's \$1.3-billion budget for 1982-1983 comes from the government (\$593 million), statutory bodies and local authorities (\$475 million) and foreign donors (\$260 million). Projects directed toward the rural areas will receive the bulk of the funds; 31 percent of the funds are for agricultural and rural development projects; 22 percent go toward the development of transport and communications facilities; and 17 percent are for energy and water development projects.⁷

In addition to its contribution to the public sector program, the government has allocated \$530 million, or 14 percent of its total 1982-1983 \$3.8-billion budget, for education, with a disproportionate amount budgeted for the construction of rural secondary schools and teacher training schools.⁸

Minister of Education and Culture Dzingai Mutumbuka reports that 92 percent of children under the age of 15 years are now in school in both urban and rural areas. Primary education is now free, except for the cost of school uniforms; however, contributions are sometimes required for school building funds. Primary school enrollment increased by 67 percent from 1979 to 1982 and secondary school enrollment tripled in the same period. School fees for secondary school are about \$70 a year.

Equitable access to educational facilities is one of the major components of the government's reconstruction program. The other major program is a two-pronged attack on the tremendously skewed distribution of land and access to facilities and assets. In 1913, 23 years after the Pioneer Column led by Cecil Rhodes marched through what was once called Southern Rhodesia,* legislation legalized the white settlers' land grab. Whites, who at no time made up more than 6 percent of the population, took 42 percent of the land; the

*British imperialist Cecil Rhodes began the colonization of what is now Zimbabwe in 1890 with his Pioneer Column's 200 white settlers and his own police force.

⁶Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development Bernard Chidzero, *The Hansard* (Harare: House of Assembly, July 29, 1982), col. 944.

⁷*Ibid.*, col. 945.

⁸*Estimates of Expenditure for Year Ending July 30, 1983* (Harare: Government Printing Office, 1982).

⁹*Zimbabwe Agricultural and Economic Review* (Harare: Modern Farming Publications, 1982), p. 26.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹¹*The Herald*, September, 23, 1982, p. 3, and November 2, 1982, p. 2.

blacks, who made up 90-plus percent of the population, were given 42 percent. Current land distribution suggests 6.3 acres of farm land for each black, compared to more than 150 acres for every white.⁹

Britain encouraged the development and export of commercial crops like citrus, tobacco and beef to meet its own consumption needs. Today, the white commercial sector produces about 80 percent of the nation's agricultural output and 90 percent of all agricultural products brought to market.

Besides taking the best land, whites devised programs that denied black farmers access to financing, technology, fertilizers, transportation—all the facilities that farmers need to compete. Subsistence farming forced men from the rural areas into the wage economy in the cities, onto the commercial farms and into the mines. For example, in 1979 the annual per capita income in rural areas was \$156 compared to \$1,625 per capita in urban areas. The average per capita income for blacks in 1978 was about \$136.50, compared to \$7,150 per capita average for whites.¹⁰

One of the indelible marks of the colonial labor system is the breakup of the family structure; black men live in the cities, sharing quarters with others like themselves or, if they are domestic workers, living in shacks built in their employers' backyards. The women remain in the rural areas to farm and to care for the young and the old. For an urban worker, transportation costs to and from the rural areas are often equivalent to a week's wages; thus urban workers visit their families only a few times a year.

In the past, black access to credit facilities and other agricultural inputs has been limited. Under the guidance of Minister of Agriculture Senator Denis Norman (one of two whites in the Cabinet), the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) extended almost 37,000 loans to small-scale and communal farmers at reduced interest rates for the 1982-1983 growing season. In September, 1982, the International Development Association, an arm of the World Bank, agreed to make \$36.4 million available to the AFC for additional loans to small-scale farmers.¹¹

Ever mindful of the importance of the commercial farming sector to the well-being of the nation (Zimbabwe and South Africa are the only African nations that grow enough food to feed their people and produce a surplus for export), the government has developed a land resettlement program to redress the inequitable distribution of land, to ease land pressures on the communal areas (formerly known as tribal trust lands), to fend off massive migration to the urban areas, and to provide land to those who were left homeless by the war.

Under the resettlement program, the government purchases abandoned or under-utilized commercial farmland on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis. Families who have neither land nor jobs receive priority in

land assignments; on average each family is assigned a place to build a house, a garden area near the house, about 12 acres of arable land for crops, and an additional 50 or so acres of grazing land.

The government's initial goal was to resettle 18,000 families a year, 54,000 over a three-year period. However, government officials now speak of resettling 162,000 families over a three-year period, 54,000 families a year.

GOALS NOT REACHED

But official rhetoric belies the facts. By mid-1982, 3.4 million acres of land had been purchased for resettlement, and 15,000 families had been resettled. The 1982-1983 budget allocates \$32.5 million for land acquisition; this amount will probably buy land for about 16,500 families, certainly not 54,000 families.

For the most part, the land that has been purchased by the government is located adjacent to communal areas. About 66 percent of it is located in areas designated as land suitable for semi-intensive farming; that is, land that is subject to drought and dry spells. Only one resettlement scheme is located in a region designated as intensive farmland.

Effective resettlement calls for more than the purchase of land and the assignment of families to farms. Over the years, rural demands have grown for all types of services. Government planners must consider the need for transport facilities, water accessibility, fuel wood, education and health services, and agricultural extension services.

As long as resettlement programs include farmland that has either been abandoned or is underproductive, the program will not take away from the nation's productive capacity. But if the program expands and resettles landless peasants on commercial farmland, the government will have to consider the ramifications of inexperienced farmers taking over prime commercial land. Clearly, the initial productive capacity of the landless peasants will be far below that of the commercial farmer and, as commercial farms are taken over, hundreds of agricultural workers will lose their jobs. In addition, land purchases drain off cash that might be put to other uses.

On the other hand, political and social factors argue for redressing the enormous inequalities between white and black. The push-pull between what the government hopes to do for the people and what it is able to do—the tension between the promises and the resources—permeates all government planning. So far,

government planners are moving carefully, so that they do not destroy growth potential in the name of achieving equity.

OBSTACLES TO GROWTH

Zimbabwe has many advantages over its neighboring states. It has a well-educated black elite, a good transportation and communications system, food self-sufficiency and an economy based on diversified exports. But like most other black African nations, it suffers from a severe shortage of skilled workers and a mushrooming population growth rate.

In Finance Minister Chidzero's 1982 budget address, he called the shortage of skilled workers one of the country's most pressing problems. He pointed to inadequate past investment in broadening the skills base; i.e., not enough money or attention has been paid to developing black workers' skills, and skilled personnel were lost when whites left the country during the war and after independence. The white exodus has leveled off to about 1,500 people a month or about 18,000 a year; most are going to South Africa. Overall, the white population has decreased from 220,000 to about 180,000.¹² There is some indication that white families are returning from South Africa, but no figures are available.

Minister of Roads and Road Traffic Daniel Ngwenya told Parliament that 45 percent of his ministry's experienced civil engineers left their jobs in 1981 and in the first six months of 1982. Some government programs are behind schedule because of the shortage of skilled personnel. Ironically, the government must bring in workers from abroad to fill jobs while the national unemployment rate continues to climb. The Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development brought in 358 foreign technicians and engineers to help implement its programs; yet, in 1981, there were 90,000 new job seekers to fill 30,000 positions.¹³

All the government's efforts to establish a more equitable society will fail if the population doubles by the year 2000, as the World Bank is currently predicting. According to the World Bank, the population growth rate in Zimbabwe between 1980 and the year 2000 will be 4.3 percent per year, the highest annual rate of growth in the world. The mid-August, 1982, census reveals a 3.3 percent growth rate since 1969, with a population increase from 5.1 million to 7.5 million. With a 4.3-percent growth rate, in the year 2000 the population of Zimbabwe will be 17 million.¹⁴

The government has not taken a visible public position on population control; but it has encouraged foreign donors, like the United States, to set up family planning programs. The United States recently agreed

(Continued on page 129)

¹²In 1981, of the 20,535 people who emigrated, 12,771 went to South Africa. *Monthly Migration and Tourist Statistics* (Harare: Central Statistical Office, July, 1982), p. 20.

¹³"Expats a New 'Tribe,'" *The Star* (Johannesburg), International Air Mail Weekly, Saturday, July 31, 1982, p. 8.

¹⁴The World Bank, *World Development Report 1982* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 142.

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"In South Africa, constitutional reform is part of the domestic strategy" that has been developed to counter the "total onslaught" on the country. But as this specialist notes, "so is increased police surveillance, intimidation, and suppression, further limitations on civil, political and economic freedoms, and intensified enforcement of tightened security legislation."

South Africa's Domestic Strategy

BY KENNETH W. GRUNDY

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SCHOLARS and analysts often argue that South Africa has essentially a split political personality: "a democracy for the *Herrenvolk* and a racialist colonial regime for the non-Whites,"¹ or a "democratic police state."² White critics of apartheid are allowed a great deal more latitude for opposition and organized dissent than black critics. Many observers regard this semblance of racially based political tolerance and representative democracy for whites as a source of strength that contributes to conserving the regime.

Among whites who talk politics there is a sense of activity, of movement, even change. But this is a terribly dangerous and misleading mood. Analysts focus on the issues and lose sight of the paradoxical reality of black powerlessness and black potential. Constitutional schemes are in fact mirages, deluding the observer into thinking that he or she is watching the real power struggle. But for blacks, little tolerance exists; life is regimented, a constant struggle to buffer costly, time-consuming and dangerous run-ins with the law.

Nonetheless, the government is caught up in its proposals for constitutional reform. Particularly since the rise of Prime Minister P. W. Botha, there has been a systematic centralization of power in the executive branch of government, particularly the concentration in the hands of Botha himself. No longer content with a casual defense of the status quo and aware of the inherent fragility of rigidity, in the past three years Botha has fashioned a dynamic status quo capable of bending yet retaining its power essentials and he has gathered the reins of power into his own hands. Thus he has downgraded Parliament and the caucus and congresses of the National party, those representative

institutions that tempt South African apologists to maintain that for whites, at least, South Africa is a democratic polity.

Not that these processes are conspiratorial or even part of a concerted plan for South Africa's future. Rather, they are a natural by-product of the drift into greater internal and external violence, unrest and dissatisfaction, a corollary of the "total national strategy" born out of the official South African perception of "total onslaught." They reflect P. W. Botha's leadership style and experience: organizational, managerial and tempered by 14 years as Minister of Defence.

With consummate political and administrative skill, P. W. Botha is taking control, although his moves do not go unchallenged. From time to time he has been forced to slow the pace of consolidation, to modify his policies, and even to retreat in the face of vocal and concerted opposition. But the trend is unmistakable. When asked, therefore, "How much real change has taken place in South Africa?" one might be well advised to look, not at the ballyhooed adjustments in race relations, the gradual dismantling of selected features of "petty apartheid," or power sharing among the races, but at the structural and institutional changes that reflect power shifts among the white ruling elites. These changes may well provide the groundwork to enable government, if it so chooses, to institute and control alterations in the future black-white nexus. Reflective of the overall process has been what is called the "rationalization" of government and public service. Botha apparently aims to clear the decks for action, but first he must streamline the government.

Power is being centralized at three levels, in complementary and coordinated moves far different from the piecemeal, ad hoc approaches that characterized the governments of J. B. Vorster and H. F. Verwoerd. The 1978 disclosures about the famous information scandal revealed a great deal about the government under Vorster.³ The scandal itself grew out of a slovenly administrative and decision-making style characterized by departmental autonomy and political competition. Vorster allegedly told top officials to proceed

¹Pierre van den Berghe, *South Africa: A Study in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 86.

²Heribert Adam, *Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 53-67. See as well the interesting debate between the two in: Donald Rothchild and Victor A. Olorunsoyo, eds., *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 127-151.

³Mervyn Rees and Chris Day, *Muldergate: The Story of the Info Scandal* (Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1980).

with their clandestine activities but to make sure that they did not get caught. He was kept uninformed of the details and even the general lines of the Information Department's activities. The revelations eventually reached the Prime Minister himself. Vorster's direction was, at best, slack. In addition, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (as then called) became, in effect, a government within a government. It was virtually independent of the Cabinet, which was supposed to be collectively responsible for its actions. Vorster's rule, in retrospect, was an organizational and administrative nightmare.

To correct this, Botha simultaneously reorganized the Cabinet, developed an interlocking system of Cabinet committees to devise policy and to coordinate its implementation, enlarged and broadened the scope of the Office of the Prime Minister, and launched a President's Council that is charged with the task of advising government in constitutional development and inter-race relations. All these layers have loosely parallel structures. For example, a number of government departments deal with social issues. Then there is a Cabinet Committee for Social Affairs. There is also a Social Planning Section of the Office of the Prime Minister; and within the President's Council a Social Affairs Committee has been established. In many respects, these offices overlap; in others, they are complementary. The centrality of P. W. Botha is common to them all. He has turned government in South Africa into administrative government. His decision-making style resembles that of a corporate president. Efficiency and direction based on planning and expert advice are ascendant. The South African state is thereby more dangerous and better able to weather domestic and external pressures.

Government based on expert input has led to an enlarged role for top-level civil servants and public officials and even to the involvement of specialists in private industry, universities, and independent think tanks. To the chagrin of politicians formerly on the fringes of power, South Africa has a government of professionals. Although it has not yet become a consultant's heaven, Pretoria has had little difficulty finding technically trained "experts" eager to sell their services to the regime. This trend, too, has been opposed by the rank and file career public officials, who have not always promptly implemented decisions taken by Botha and his inner circle of partisans and advisers. The traditional maxim, "the expert should be on tap, not on top," still applies; but in some fields like economy and defense, the authorities have allowed the specialists to determine the agenda and to formulate alternatives. It is because the co-opted experts have demonstrated their loyalty to Botha or because they already share the perspective of those in power that they have been allowed so much authority.

*R = South African rand.

Nowhere is this trend more apparent than in South Africa's domestic security, regional and defense policies. Here, specialists in control, intimidation and violence have taken the lead in shaping state policy, frequently in areas only remotely linked to security. And this neatly dovetails with the consolidation of power in the hands of P. W. Botha and what might be called his security establishment.

THE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT

The constellation of forces can be divided into six components. First is the South African Defence Force and the Ministry of Defence, principally those Permanent Force officers charged with shaping overall defense strategy and applying it in Namibia.

Second is the intelligence community, which consists of the Department of Military Intelligence, the National Intelligence Service (NIS, the successor to BOSS), and the Security Police. Although there has long been intense rivalry (one might even see it as guerrilla warfare among these services), they occasionally cooperate. Certainly all contribute to a fund of intelligence information about the regime's alleged and actual opponents. Nowadays, however, it is widely agreed that military intelligence is the strongest of the three branches.

Third is the segment of the intellectual community that serves the defense establishment on an ad hoc contractual basis, including the centers of strategic studies based at Rand Afrikaans University, the University of Pretoria, and the University of South Africa; independent bodies like the Terrorism Research Centre in Cape Town; Ronald Reid-Daly's team of ex-Rhodesian security technicians in Johannesburg; and individual academics on call for the government.

A fourth component of the defense establishment is the armaments and related industries, headed by parastatal corporations like the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR), SASOL (the state petroleum firm), and private subcontracting firms. ARMSCOR is one of South Africa's biggest industrial undertakings, and with R1.2 billion in assets,* it probably ranks second among South Africa's industrial giants. What is more, up to 60 percent of the corporation's production is contracted out, thereby enlisting private sector companies and research firms in the growing enterprise. Today, ARMSCOR provides work for about 100,000 people; as the world's tenth largest arms manufacturer, it is a powerful economic and political force.

A fifth component is the South African Police (SAP). SAP's paramilitary formations patrol the border and are used in Namibia. There is an extremely high level of interaction and cooperation between SAP and SADF, especially in Namibia, on the borders, and in township control. The SADF wants to avoid the stigma of repressing the civil population, but roadblocks in

urban areas are as likely to be manned by the army as by the police, and in major township raids the army cordons the area to enable the police to move in.

FIRST AMONG EQUALS

Many of these groups and functions are brought together in the sixth element of the establishment—the State Security Council, the key organization through which security policy is determined. Technically the SSC is only one among the five pivotal Cabinet committees. In fact, it is *primus inter pares*. It is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its range of interests seems to be wider than other Cabinet committees, largely because its participants subscribe to and propagate the idea of "total national strategy" to combat a "total onslaught" aimed at South Africa. Seen from this angle, very little cannot be subsumed under the rubric "security."

Although the actual SSC membership has never been publicly disclosed, it includes at least the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Police, and Justice, and the senior member of the Cabinet. The SSC also includes the top-ranking civil servants in each of those ministries. Thus the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, the chief of the SADF (General C. L. Viljoen), the commissioner of police, the head of NIS, and the secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister participate. Lieutenant General A. J. van Deventer, head of the Secretariat of the SSC, also attends, as do the Ministers who chair each of the other four Cabinet committees. Others in government and in private life may be co-opted to attend individual meetings. The body is composed of heavyweights, supplemented by the highest ranking government experts in security. When they recommend policy, the Cabinet is not likely to refuse.

The SSC came into existence in 1972 as one of 20 Cabinet committees. Under Vorster it met sporadically. P. W. Botha reduced the number of permanent Cabinet committees to five, but the SSC is the only one established by law with a fixed membership. The military stands at the hub. The secretariat of the SSC, its operational and administrative arm, is rumored to be staffed by SADF personnel. Its head, Lieutenant General van Deventer, is personally close to the Prime Minister. As many as 70 percent of its initial comple-

⁴*Financial Mail*, vol. 82, no. 2 (October 9, 1981), p. 174.

⁵Kenneth W. Grundy, "The Social Costs of Armed Struggle in Southern Africa," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 7, no. 3 (spring, 1981), pp. 445-466.

⁶*Sunday Express*, June 13, 1982, p. 4; *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), June 3, 1982, p. 1.

⁷See Kenneth W. Grundy, *Soldiers without Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

⁸See the results of a recent survey of public attitudes on foreign affairs issues conducted by Deon Geldenhuys on behalf of the South African Institute of International Affairs: "Siege Mentality," *Financial Mail*, vol. 86, no. 8 (November 19, 1982).

ment come from the SADF; 20 percent are from NIS and around 10 percent are from the Department of Foreign Affairs.⁴

To add to the power of the military establishment, SADF officers are prominent in many high-level, interdepartmental committees and they have direct input into diverse government commissions and investigatory bodies. For example, the SADF has supplied researchers to the Human Sciences Research Council to study press reporting. Its officers have testified on homelands consolidation before the van der Walt Commission, and on the future of District 6 (once a Coloured "group area" in Cape Town) before the President's Council. The SADF has even lent personnel to the Receiver of Revenues and to Customs and Excise agencies. The security establishment's voice is loud, steady, ubiquitous and usually consistent. As a result, it is often heeded.

Not only has the defense and security establishment become active in high government agencies, but the general tenor of life in South Africa contributes to the preparation for a violent confrontation with the forces of radical change. The past decade saw a rise in the level of militarization of South African society, especially of its white segments. More and more young white men are obligated to serve longer and longer in the National [Military] Service.⁵ After an initial two-year stint, service in a part-time or reserve capacity has been lengthened and made more frequent. In addition, youngsters in high schools join cadet units for paramilitary training and many pre-high-school youth attend veld schools where they are politicized and indoctrinated into the necessity to defend the "South African way."⁶ Larger numbers of blacks now serve in the SADF (by early 1983 around 9,000).⁷ These numbers would be enlarged if homelands forces and indigenous troops in Namibia were included. White women are also encouraged to join the organization. Militarization has not yet reached the degree it has reached in Israel or in most socialist bloc countries, but it is considerably advanced over patterns that prevailed before the fear of "total onslaught" was heightened. In dozens of other ways, South Africa displays a siege mentality, preparing for the eventual conflict that a segregated apartheid model of social relations was supposed to render unlikely.⁸

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Talk of government reorganization involving major constitutional change has long engaged white political elites, including all the political parties represented in Parliament. Despite its "safe" majority in Parliament, through the 1970's the National party has expressed dissatisfaction with the truncated Westminster system in force since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The heterogeneity of South African society and the constraints imposed on government by

the parliamentary system make it awkward to maintain government secrecy and to abrogate and deny ordinary civil and political rights for critics and large majorities of the population. The Nationalists have been shopping for a constitutional alternative more in keeping with their vision of a plural but controllable society organized along separate communal lines.

In 1973, the Theron Commission began investigating matters relating to the Coloured community. In its 1976 report, it was suggested that the Westminster system be reconsidered. This led to the appointment of a Cabinet committee chaired by P. W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, to consider whether a new political "dispensation" could be formulated. South Africans are partial to the term "dispensation," which is not inaccurate, since the presumption is that all change will be handed down from on high. Their 1977 proposals involving only the white, Coloured and Asian peoples were later approved by provincial congresses of the National party and were embodied in a draft bill that Parliament tabled in 1979. The bill, in turn, was referred to the Schlebusch Commission, which was charged with reporting on a new constitution for South Africa.

Its 1980 report led to the appointment of the President's Council, ostensibly to draft a final blueprint for a new constitution. For its assignment, whites and a few Coloureds and Asians were appointed to the President's Council. But the Progressive Federal party, an opposition party to the left of the Nationalists, refused to participate because the Council did not include blacks and made no provision for major changes that would bring blacks into the new dispensation. Most Coloured, Asian and black politicians refused to cooperate or else withdrew once they learned of the narrow range of the Council's brief.

In May, 1982, the President's Council submitted its recommendations for constitutional change.⁹ The Prime Minister immediately took up the recommendations and began to try to develop his own responses to lay before his party congresses and eventually before Parliament. The nationwide debate began. But the two swing groups—the Coloureds and the Asians—held their punches until they could discern the Prime Minister's precise position on the matter. Black South Africans are soured by the entire exercise, which so patently avoids the obvious issues.

A word about the recommendations of the President's Council is in order. Simply stated, the constitutional committee proposed that an executive President be chosen indirectly by an electoral college consisting of all racial groups except black Africans

(who constitute about 70 percent of the total population). The Council claimed that the President would therefore be above ethnic or communal interests (which would be rather difficult when 70 percent of the population is consciously excluded), and strong enough to initiate and implement major reforms. In order to be able to do this, he would have to be independent of popular election and/or parliamentary control. It is significant that for the first time, the top men in power proposed the participation of Indians and Coloureds in central, heretofore exclusively all-white, government organs. This proposal led to defections from the right-wing of the National party and the growth of the Conservative party, led by ex-Nationalist leader and Minister Andries Treurnicht. But equally significant is the widespread realization that without black involvement, there will be little real change in the distribution of power.

Was the President's Council anxious to involve Coloureds and Asians in order to enlist them in defense of a slightly revised status quo against black interests? Or were the proposals to be an interim scheme to ready the ground for the later inclusion of selected or co-opted blacks? These questions are being hotly discussed. Yet the message seems clear. The Council itself asserted that "a single political system in South Africa which included Coloureds and Indians on an equal basis with whites *could* function successfully as a consociational democracy."¹⁰ But it claimed at the same time that a unitary system that included blacks would not work.

PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

This, then, is the dilemma. In the Council's view, democracy for South Africa cannot succeed if it includes blacks on "an unqualified majoritarian or consociational basis." Yet most thinking people believe that democracy without the black majority would be even more impossible. The Council maintains that "*group domination must be eliminated* if South Africa is not to face increasing political instability and social and economic disruption."¹¹ But any scheme that excludes blacks is little more than minority domination. Blacks criticize the proposals because they fail to address the most central of South Africa's race issues, that is, black-white relations. Many conservative whites criticize the Council's work as dangerous since it appears to bypass the entrenched institutions of the Afrikaner volk or nation. They fear that an Executive President who is independent of Parliament might enact "reforms" that would destroy the basis for white control.

In the midst of this fierce division, P. W. Botha developed and presented his slightly revised version of a constitutional plan. He claims that it is based on the twin pillars of self-determination for each of the three groups (not including blacks) with respect to their "own" affairs and the joint responsibility of all three

⁹Republic of South Africa, *First Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council* (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1982).

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 19-20.

¹¹Ibid., p. 18. Emphasis in the original.

groups on matters of common interest. The new structure is to include:

1. A President as executive head of state combining the present offices of state President and Prime Minister. He cannot be a member of Parliament while serving as President. He is to be elected by an electoral college.
2. An electoral college of 50 white, 25 Coloured, and 13 Asian members appointed by their respective chambers in Parliament.
3. A tricameral Parliament with separate chambers for the three population groups. Each group will elect its chamber from its own separate voters' roll and each will determine policy on matters affecting its own group. The President, however, is to decide which matters exclusively concern one group and which are common concerns to be decided jointly by all three chambers.
4. A Cabinet appointed by the President. This will be a joint body of fixed number and is supposed to include members of all three racial groups, again excluding blacks. Operation of the Cabinet is to be facilitated by Cabinet committees.
5. A 60-member President's Council (20 whites, 10 Coloureds and 5 Asians elected by their parliamentary chambers and 25 nominated by the President) which will act as the final arbiter in disputes over interpretation of the latest dispensation.

In July, 1982, the Prime Minister presented these recommendations to his party's federal congress in Bloemfontein and achieved near unanimous support. Subsequent provincial National party congresses confirmed this support. Of course, those inclined to oppose such ideas had already left the party to join the Conservatives or the Herstigte National party (HNP).

A series of by-elections between August and November indicated that right-wing opposition to the National party (Nats) had grown significantly, but it had not yet coalesced enough to gain parliamentary seats. In the Germiston by-election, the CP and HNP vote, added together, outnumbered votes for the Nationalist candidate. Likewise, the Nats were outvoted (though they still captured the seat) in a Free State Provincial Council election.

The ideological and tactical struggle within Afrika-

¹²See Deon Geldenhuys, *Some Foreign Policy Implications of South Africa's "Total National Strategy," with particular reference to the "12-point plan"* (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, March, 1981); and Philip Frankel, "Race and Counter-Revolution: South Africa's Total Strategy," *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 18, no. 3 (October, 1980), pp. 272-293.

¹³General Magnus Malan, September 3, 1980, as quoted in Geldenhuys, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹⁴For background see Kenneth W. Grundy, "Economic Patterns in the New Southern African Balance," in Gwenolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., *Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis*, 2d ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 291-312; and "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa," in Carter and O'Meara, eds., *International Politics in Southern Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 148-178.

nerdom takes place in other arenas, too. The Broederbond, cultural organizations, the universities, the Afrikaanse press, the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, the business community, the trade unions, and the churches are divided on the question of how much to bend to avoid real power shifts. Even in this *broederwits* (brother's quarrel), P. W. Botha and his supporters are hardly *verligte* (so-called open-minded Nationalists and "liberal" thinkers). But the tenacity of the right-wing should come as no surprise. In the 1983 session of Parliament, the Prime Minister will introduce his proposals. This will be a bitter test, leading nowhere.

THE TOTAL ONSLAUGHT

These two trends—an enlarged and indispensable role for the security establishment, and constitutional reform—represent a dual response to South Africa's condition: the stick and the carrot. The South African ruling elite believes that South Africa is the target of a "total onslaught," involving all facets of public and private affairs, and fundamentally orchestrated from Moscow.¹²

The total onslaught is an ideologically motivated struggle and the aim is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state. The aim is therefore total, not only in terms of the ideology, but also as regards the political, social, economic and technological areas.¹³

Total onslaught aims at "the overthrow of the present constitutional order and its replacement by a subject communist-oriented government." This perspective and its general acceptance by the white populace reflect the dramatic shift in the regional balance of power and the shrinking "hinterland" where the Republic of South Africa can openly and legitimately operate.¹⁴

"Total national strategy" necessitates a vigorous foreign policy involving the "independent" homelands and bona fide neighboring states. Thus schemes for a constellation or confederation of states requiring economic, political and security cooperation are spun out of Pretoria. Frequent planning and collaboration take place at all levels. But as long as South Africa pursues a regional policy that embarrasses and destab-

(Continued on page 132)

Kenneth W. Grundy is the author of *Guerrilla Struggle in Africa* (New York: Grossman, 1971) and *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), and is the coauthor of *Ideologies of Violence* (Columbus: Merrill, 1974). His current work deals with blacks in the South African armed forces (including the homelands, Namibia and the police) and will be published in 1983 by the University of California Press. He spent 3 months in South Africa in 1982.

"Nonetheless, the PNDC government survives, and its radical populist impulses are not altogether obscured by Rawlings' preoccupations with security. Its more important programs for social and economic change could not possibly have borne fruit in 1982. . . . At the end of 1982, however, the future of revolutionary change in Ghana was an open question."

Revolution and the Military in Ghana

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ON December 31, 1981, a small group of military and ex-military personnel seized power in Ghana, ousting President Hill Limann's civilian government and the People's National Party (PNP) and propelling Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings into power for a second time. In June, 1979, when Rawlings first emerged as the leader of a mutiny-turned-coup against a military government, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) energetically launched purges and investigations of senior military officers and state officials to expose corruption and power abuses.

Four months later, AFRC surrendered power to President Limann's elected civilian government, which was warned to carry through AFRC-initiated investigations and reforms. In 1982, in response to the economic failures and political corruption of the Limann government, Rawlings launched a genuine political and social revolution.

All revolutionary endeavors face massive conflicts and contradictions, and this applies with special force in Ghana under Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). These contradictions have profoundly weakened the revolutionary effort in Ghana; by the end of 1982, the PNDC regime was exceptionally weak and in constant jeopardy from coups and government breakdown.

The contradictions abound. Armed with a populist and radical anger and vision, Rawlings seeks to push a civilian population into revolutionary change, but he has been unable to control the military, the regime's major political and institutional base. The coup was apparently launched not by committed radicals but by military and former military personnel fearful of imminent arrest for plotting against the government. Hence, the regime was composed of ad hoc, jerry-built factions that were increasingly divided against themselves. Unfortunately, Rawlings' major instrument is an increasingly undisciplined, factionalized and violence-prone military, whose coercive propensities have probably alienated as many Ghanaians as Rawlings' vision has attracted.

Rawlings has tried to draw support from workers, students and other Ghanaian groups to build a class base in opposition to Ghana's bourgeoisie of professionals, senior state bureaucrats and businessmen. But the economy is so desperately unproductive and essential goods and local foods are so scarce that he has had relatively little to offer. Enfeebled public institutions have been disrupted by purges, investigations, fear and "revolutionary" directives that arise from enthusiasm rather than from coordinated decisions and considered policies. Major efforts to create a "moral" economy by making local foods and essential commodities available to the ordinary Ghanaian at tolerable prices have led to the disappearance of these commodities from the market, providing premiums for corrupt behavior.

Nonetheless, during 1982 a populist revolution of sorts was proceeding. Its legitimacy and power were imperiled less by the opposition of Ghana's bourgeoisie than by military brutality against civilians, policy incoherence, and dissension and conflict within the military and the PNDC, whose original membership had been wholly decimated by the end of 1982.

Since 1972, several Ghanaian regimes have contributed significantly to prolonged economic misery, the progressive weakening of the legitimacy and ability of state and other public institutions, the destruction of the country's productive capacity, and a concentration of income and wealth among businessmen, traders, black marketeers and others with access to state power.

The military regime of Colonel (later General) I.K. Acheampong (1972-1978) commenced with a populist rejection of the liberalizing economic policies of the democratic civilian regime of Prime Minister Kofi Busia (1969-1972). The new regime unilaterally repudiated some and rescheduled other foreign debts. It banned all political activities and parties and formulated economic policies of self-reliance, nationalism, and the intensification of local food production. However, the regime's reformist impulses and management capacities declined sharply. In order to maintain authority in the face of economic crises in the mid-

and late 1970's, it pursued wild spending policies. These policies, in turn, generated hyperinflation and negative economic growth; the regime then adopted increasingly coercive measures against the civilian protests that were animated by the deteriorating economy.

A high level of civilian resistance to military rule followed, led by university (and other) students, lawyers, and other professionals, who went on prolonged strikes in 1977 and 1978. Many of the lawyers and other professionals had been linked with Busia's Progress party government (1969-1972). Among the many civilian leaders who sided with Acheampong's increasingly corrupt military regime were some surviving "old guard" members of Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's party (CPP).¹

Pushed by middle-ranking officers, the military ultimately ousted Acheampong and his senior cohorts from power in July, 1978, and moved toward a restoration of democratic civilian rule in 1979. However, the military protected those within its senior ranks (including the deposed Acheampong) who had engaged in massive authoritarian abuses, corruption and economic mismanagement. Once Acheampong had been removed, hundreds of groups and trade unions protested throughout Ghana, seeking rectification of the regime's abuses, punishment for those responsible, and economic policies to compensate for the hyperinflation and consumer shortages of the late 1970's. In June, 1979, angry lower ranks of the military mutinied to punish their senior officers, who had disgraced the military in the public's eyes, enriched themselves and impoverished the ordinary soldier. Eight senior officers—three of whom were former heads of state, Acheampong included—were promptly executed after a travesty of a trial. Others were dispatched to long prison terms after closed and perfunctory trials. Under Rawlings and other junior officers who stepped forward to take charge of the disintegrating military, AFRC transformed the mutiny into a populist attack on state and other officials and businessmen who had ravaged the economy and had looted the public coffers.

There were several major consequences. First, the military virtually collapsed in the face of rank and file and noncommissioned officer attacks, the "trials" and prison terms, and lower rank and junior officer refusal to acknowledge senior officer authority. Second, when AFRC attacked other state institutions—ranging from ministries to public corporations—subordinates there played a similar role. This attack on the managerial bourgeoisie and the investigations into the performance of most public institutions disrupted their already enfeebled performance. Investigations into private business practices generated widespread fear

among Ghana's sizable bourgeoisie. Third, while Rawlings became a folk hero, Ghanaians were horrified that the military continued to attack civilians, whipping market women for alleged hoarding or selling above control prices, and unleashing random violence. Increasingly split by dissensions and by suspicions of tribal-ethnic favoritism, AFRC surrendered its rule to President Limann and the PNP, elected some months earlier.

The economic consequences of the military regimes during 1972-1979 were a major contribution to the problems of the Limann government and the current PNDC regime. Economic growth was negative during 1970-1979. Gross domestic product per capita declined on average over 3 percent per year. Ghana had a deficit in its balance of payments during most of 1972-1979 and managed to maintain a decent overall balance only by systematically choking off badly needed imports. It had persistent arrears in short-term debts (\$438.5 million in late 1979), reducing its ability to obtain private credit abroad.

Its balance of payments problems, though aggravated by the oil price shocks of the mid-1970's and the subsequent general inflation, can be traced to sharp declines in the production of its major exports—cocoa, gold, diamonds and timber. This drastically reduced its ability to import capital equipment, spare parts and essential consumer goods. Severe shortages sharply reduced Ghana's domestic production and stimulated a pervasive black market in essential commodities. Particularly important was the persistent decline in the volume of cocoa production available for purchase and export, largely because of the decline in real prices offered by the state monopoly buyer. Average cocoa purchases declined by 31.3 percent during the four crop years 1976-1980 in comparison with 1969-1973. In 1972, cocoa farmers were paid 78 percent of what they were paid in 1968 per load of 66 pounds; in 1979 they received only 49 percent. Hence cocoa smuggling to neighboring countries grew, while many farmers shifted out of cocoa production into higher priced local foods.

Ghanaians also suffered a hyperinflation in the late 1970's: 53 percent in 1976, 116 percent in 1977, 74 percent in 1978, 54 percent in 1979, an average annual increase of 46.6 percent during 1972-1979. However, the real impact of inflation can only be observed by the average yearly rate of inflation compounded, which was 211.7 percent during 1972-1979. Inflation shifted incomes massively to traders, black marketeers and food farmers, who benefited from massive local food price increases. Local food production is estimated to have declined 21 percent in the years 1976-1978 from the years 1969-1971.

THE UNDERLYING FACTORS

The causes of Ghana's economic plight compound

¹The CCP ruled Ghana during 1957-1966 before being ousted by the first military regime (1966-1969), which gave way to the elected Busia government (1969-1972).

one another. Some were external or beyond Ghana's control: the oil price hikes of the 1970's, severe droughts in northern Ghana in the 1974-1976 years, worldwide inflation (and thus increased costs in imports), and a deterioration in terms of trade after 1977. Ghanaians have tended to blame incompetent and corrupt leadership and economic mismanagement for their problems, but they have been politically incapable of facing the effects of their economic policies. Populist pressures to keep down the costs of living, e.g., through price controls, have been more important to Ghanaian leaders, despite the manifest failure of such efforts. Nor is it simply a question of radical versus conservative economic policies. Policymakers have felt compelled—in Ghana and many other African countries—to run large budget deficits in order to maintain nominally high levels of economic activity and employment, to retain overvalued exchange rates, when devaluation would increase the local costs of imports (i.e., generate a real wage decline for consumers of imports, who are disproportionately middle and upper class), to subsidize inefficient state corporations, to fund large-scale and mostly unproductive state farms or large private farmers rather than the fairly productive small and medium-sized peasant farmers. The Acheampong regime undertook all these measures, generating inflation by colossal budget deficits, in part by failing to collect taxes from the wealthy.

The Limann government did little better. Thus Limann and the PNP government confronted enormous problems and policy dilemmas. It managed within some months to contain the continued military violence against the police and the public. It tried to deal with the AFRC leaders and Rawlings by shipping them out of the country or, failing that—and Rawlings refused to leave—by employing high levels of surveillance and repression. It was reported that hundreds of rank and file soldiers and junior officers were arrested, secretly tried and imprisoned.

Limann's government was under enormous public pressure to increase economic activity, keep down inflation, increase local food production, and provide scarce essential imported commodities. Its initial policies were tolerable, but it declined to acknowledge (as had Acheampong) the perverse impact of the drastic overvaluation of the Ghanaian cedi and the impact of partially effective price controls on the distribution of resources and production. These contributed to the continuing collapse or underutilization of existing industries, massive smuggling, shortages and a flourishing black market. Overvaluation of the cedi increased the incentive to consume imports (making them relatively cheap) and drastically reduced incentives to produce for export (high local costs could not be recovered because the government paid so few cedis per foreign dollars earned through exports).

The Limann government was moving slowly toward

devaluation of the cedi, which would have helped shift income from traders to producers and might have led to larger foreign government and international loans and aid. Higher levels of production in cocoa, coffee, and rice (consumed locally) could have been achieved through increasing producer prices, which the government did not do until November, 1981. By 1980, cocoa farmers were being paid in real terms 33 percent of the price they received in 1963; by 1981, only 14 percent. Ghana's 1980-1981 cocoa crop of 258,000 metric tons was the lowest since the late 1950's. Many farmers declined to harvest their crop. Combined with sharply lower world cocoa prices, this led to an estimated 40 percent decline in Ghana's 1981 export earnings and a 32 percent decline in imports, which further aggravated shortages, black-marketing and inflation. The greed of PNP Members of Parliament in giving themselves enormous rates of pay generated renewed demands for large wage hikes from workers and salaried employees (all of whom had suffered enormous losses in real wages). The tripling of the minimum wage and other salaries in late 1980 sharply increased the government's budget deficit and hence inflationary tendencies. Inflation was contained at 50.1 percent in 1980 but grew to 116 percent in 1981.

The Limann government's crucial political problem was that it was partially controlled by different factions of the "old guard" CPP leaders whose propensities to corruption were widely known. Their struggle over control of the party exploded into public view in late 1981 in court battles amidst accurate stories of corruption and a \$1-million foreign loan to PNP leaders. Limann himself was a weak leader; he had become PNP president only through "old guard" support and was dependent upon them. The public perception of squalid party leaders competing for the spoils of office, combined with rampant inflation and consumer shortages, endowed the government and democratic institutions with scant legitimacy. Many Ghanaians, including the most skilled and educated, were voting with their feet and leaving Ghana to work elsewhere, especially in Nigeria. At the same time, some units of the military voted with their guns.

POPULIST REVOLUTION

Under Rawlings, the PNDC seized power in order to pursue revolutionary change, and it has done so in some areas, most critically in its encouragement of the creation of thousands of People's Defense Committees (PDC's) and, in workplaces, Workers' Defense Committees. Their members have risen to attack corruption and economic mismanagement in all public institutions, providing the kind of accountability that Rawlings has demanded and mobilizing communities in public tasks. By January, 1982, the government of Ghana was virtually without resources. It was generating an inordinate budget deficit and had negative

foreign reserves and debt arrears of \$348 million, making it unable to obtain foreign bank credits. At the same time, it faced an oil boycott from Nigeria² and confronted a desperate shortage of the spare parts and inputs needed to revive unused industrial capacity and to repair Ghana's eroded infrastructure. World prices for Ghana's major exports—cocoa and gold—remained extremely low, and Ghana was devoting over 40 percent of its export earnings to oil imports alone. Thus, no short-term economic improvements were possible, except through better management of resources, more rational domestic economic policies, and an expansion of exports.

It is difficult to tell how radical the socioeconomic changes of the PNDC will be and how successfully those changes will be implemented. It tried to move to the ports the 40 percent of the previous year's cocoa crop that had not yet been shipped. It reasserted price controls over essential commodities and local foods, rechanneling their allocation procedures, reducing hoarding and smuggling to make more goods available, and trying to enforce the reduction of other prices and costs. With the help of the PDC's, it established and energetically implemented rent controls, previously untried in any serious way. The PNDC froze large bank accounts, while Citizens Vetting Committees required the owners of the accounts to appear and produce evidence of taxes paid on earnings. The individuals were liable and the taxes had to be paid within 48 hours or their assets were confiscated by the state. Major attacks were launched against many institutions—the legal system, the trade union movement, state corporations, the expensive system of secondary boarding schools (whose government subsidies grew as local food prices soared), and businessmen with government and state corporation contracts—in order to refashion them and democratize their practices and operations.

PNDC LEADERSHIP

Rawlings announced the leadership of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) in early January, 1982, and it was significant for its stunning non-representative quality. It was composed of Rawlings as chairman; Brigadier-General Joseph Nunoo-Mensah (appointed Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) under AFRC, then curiously dismissed by the Limann government and reappointed as CDS by Rawlings in his initial coup announcement); Sergeant Afolga Akata-Pore, an articulate radical who was a military academy instructor; Warrant Officer J.A. Buadi, who worked with the AFRC Secretariat in 1979; the Reverend Kwabena Damuah, a defrocked Catholic priest (reinstated in

1980) who has always been politically outspoken; Joshua Amarte Kwei, a former local trade union leader; and Chris Bukari Atim, a former student leader, a radical and secretary to the June 4th Movement that Rawlings had created after his dismissal from the military in 1980.

The PNDC's membership was distinctly different from that of any prior military junta, lacking significant active duty officer representation and almost half civilian. Other former officers were closely linked with Rawlings and the PNDC and were later given offices, including Captain Kojo Tsikata, an established radical, as special adviser, and Colonel J.M. Ewa (as chief of staff, PNDC office). Presumably, the civilians were to be the PNDC's links with potentially sympathetic groups: the Reverend Damuah with the Protestant and Catholic ministries, which had been extremely active in the agitation against the Acheampong military regime during 1977-1978; Chris Atim with students and, in particular, with the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), which quickly rallied to the support of the PNDC; and Joshua Amarte Kwei with dissident trade unionists whom, in fact, he helped to rally in attacks against the established trade union leadership until it was forcibly displaced in late April.

By mid-December, only two of the original seven members remained—Rawlings and J.A. Buadi. Reverend Damuah resigned or was dismissed in mid-August, following the murder of the High Court judges, as he became increasingly critical of violence and condemned the self-styled radicals who attacked and damaged various fraternal lodges (Freemasons, Odd Fellows) in Kumasi and Accra, to which Ghanaian professionals belonged. Amarte Kwei resigned or was dismissed at the same time, possibly because of PNDC concern that the public was linking Kwei, a former GIHOC employee, with the murder of Major Sam Acquah, GIHOC Group Personnel Manager, along with the High Court judges. Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah resigned in late November, in despair at the PNDC's inability to deal with Ghana's problems.

The next day, a major countercoup was launched against Rawlings, bringing to a head a month-long conflict between Rawlings and Sergeant Akata-Pore, after which Akata-Pore was arrested. Amarte Kwei was also reportedly arrested. Shortly thereafter, Chris Atim was reportedly dropped from the PNDC. Only two people have been added: Anna Enin, Marketing Manager of the State Fishing Corporation, and Ebo Tawiah, Acting General Secretary of the Maritime and Dockworkers Union (whose own base of support in the MDU is unlikely to be strong, since he replaced the highly popular Richard Baiden). It is reasonable to wonder if the PNDC remains in any sense a governing body, if it ever was one.

Rawlings and his associates selected from a broader base the government Secretaries (the equivalent of

²To which Ghana owed \$150 million in unpaid oil bills, and which was angered at the overthrow of an elected civilian government.

ministers), though Rawlings encountered stiff protests from NUGS and the radical left for four of his appointments. It took five months to win approval for a candidate for Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning, reflecting intense conflict over the economic policies to be pursued by the PNDC government. Of 20 Cabinet posts (excluding Defense, controlled by Rawlings), 7 positions were given to former party leaders, 4 from the left wing of the PNP, 1 to an experienced ambassador (a trade specialist), at least 3 to professors, another 4 or more to experienced technocrats and managers, and only 1 post to a military officer (retired). Many secretaries were of high caliber.

The PNDC and Rawlings's political base rested on several groups or institutions: the military, especially several units of the army and air force, notably the army's Reece Squadron (armored cars); university students and NUGS; the People's Defense Committees (PDC's) and Workers Defense Committees (WDC's), whose high level of local activism was the PNDC's most important grassroots link with the population, its most critical potential for mobilizing Ghanaians in behalf of PNDC goals. Of more doubtful support was a renewed trade union movement, many of whose leaders were severed without members' consent; the union spent 1982 reorganizing and selecting new leadership, trying to retain some autonomy from the PNDC, which promised non-interference in elections (and was under pressure from other African unions to do so). There were also a few professional groups, primarily people with technical skills who had responded to the PNDC's appeal for skilled people, and independent intellectuals. In addition, there were political groups; their resolutions and statements appeared frequently in the wholly controlled press, but their membership was meager and included largely leftist intellectuals, except for Rawlings's own June 4th Movement.

The key group in this coalition is the military, in which Rawlings retains significant support. Rawlings lives in Condor Barracks in Burma Camp, on Accra's outskirts, a center of PNDC activity. Despite the absence of active duty officers in the PNDC or government or as heads of state corporations, sectors of the military have been entrusted with key responsibilities, including the security of the Rawlings government (but the military is also the PNDC's major threat).

The military presence is palpable in the major cities, at roadblocks, during night-long curfews. It has been assigned responsibility for the distribution of essential commodities, the enforcement of price controls, the pursuit of hoarders, anti-smuggling exercises, and border control. These activities led elements of the military into repeated instances of brutality against civilians

throughout 1982, giving rise to continuous public criticism. Officers at the borders (especially at Aflao, on the border with Togo) and at the airport confiscate on all pretexts the possessions of returning Ghanaians; those protesting are frequently beaten. Military personnel who have confiscated hoarded goods have engaged in *kalebule* (selling at black market prices) to Ghanaians after curfew.

The military is a fragile support base for revolutionary change. First of all, when coup leaders sought to foment the ouster of the Limann regime, many units in Accra were uninterested; others subsequently resisted the coup with arms. Within the military, enthusiasm for Rawlings's coup was far from universal, not least among an officer corps whose declining numbers had just survived the assaults on its members and authority under AFRC. Thus support for the government became a matter of prolonged negotiations. Second, the coup itself unleashed violence between the officers and other ranks and renewed the potential for violence. In February, three naval officers in Sekondi were shot and killed by their men. The threatened erosion of authority has been increased by the deliberate politicization of the other ranks and NCO's. This step was undertaken in part because Rawlings has argued, correctly, that the military has tended to be used in Africa as an instrument of coercion against the common man, and he insists this must not reoccur in Ghana.

Third, the outbreak of the coup and fighting on December 31, 1981, led immediately to some looting and signaled the reemergence of indiscipline in the ranks, whose most frequent target has been civilians. The most outrageous case occurred in Kumasi, a major city, in February, 1982, when an army major interrupted a church service and asked the congregation to leave and join in a pothole-filling exercise (the military frequently corrals civilians for such public exercises). An incensed congregation apparently beat the major to death; a policewoman who was a member of the church was wounded and taken to a hospital. Soldiers removed her for questioning and she was found later badly beaten, returned to the hospital for surgery, and later allegedly shot to death by soldiers. Troops later burned some churches, killed the minister of the offending congregation, and besieged the Kumasi Police Station.³

This is certainly atypical of Ghana, but there have been many instances of brutality and some murder.⁴

(Continued on page 131)

Jon Kraus' most recent publications are chapters on Ghana in *Industrial Relations in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) and on Nigeria and the Ivory Coast in *Current History Encyclopedia of Developing Nations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982).

³See *West Africa*, March 1, 1982, p. 617.

⁴See "Present Discontents," *West Africa*, July 19, 1982, p. 1855.

"The Horn's importance in international affairs derives chiefly from its geographic location at the juncture of black and Arab Africa, the southern end of the Red Sea, the western flank of the Indian Ocean and its proximity to the Persian Gulf. . . . However, "Soviet interests and activities" in the area are increasing, "whereas those of the United States are waning."

Continuing Problems in Africa's Horn

BY W. A. E. SKURNIK
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IN 1982, in the Horn of Africa, there were attempted coups d'état, civil wars, armed attacks across international political boundaries, millions of refugees, and not enough to eat.¹ Uneasy and suspicious, regional and neighboring states watched developments, finding it difficult enough to manage their own problems without worrying about Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. And then there were the superpowers and their friends, looking after their own national interests—the Soviet Union comfortably ensconced in Ethiopia and the United States trying to stay out of Somalia's irredentist adventures.

Yet a chronicle of these events masks the tragedy afflicting the peoples of that area. Both Ethiopia and Somalia have hailed nationalism, trying at the same time to earn a living that is meager at best (both Ethiopia and Somalia are among the world's "least developed" states). In the Horn, many people paid taxes destined for remote governments; tens of thousands were inducted into the armed forces; many more thousands were victims of oppression; others fled to neighboring states or took up arms against the "new order." The three countries of the Horn host between 1.5 million and 2.5 million refugees—estimates vary—a number equivalent to one-fourth of their population.

Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam and his Supreme Council, Ethiopia is still reeling from the aftermath of the 1974 revolution. The military government is seeking to demonstrate its legitimacy as the heir to a feudal empire, to overcome internal rebellion and threatened secession, to control Somali-dominated territory in the southeast, to bolster a disastrous economy, to minimize Soviet influence, and to prevent further political disaffection, particularly among the military. The regime is one of the continent's most brutal and repressive, singled out by organizations like Amnesty International as a major violator of human rights.

The Council was encouraged by the Soviet Union to create a political structure to control the country more effectively, which led to the Commission Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE). Trade union and peasant organizations were placed under COPWE supervision in 1982, but its effectiveness remains to be demonstrated. Not all Ethiopians accept Mengistu's dependence on a foreign power, and his many failures are sharply resented. The possibility of a military coup cannot be discounted, particularly given Mengistu's viciousness in dealing with his opponents.

One of Ethiopia's major long-range problems is the dissatisfaction of important ethnic groups. By far the most serious of these centrifugal forces is Eritrea, which borders the Red Sea and provides Ethiopia with its only international port (a French-built railroad connects Addis Ababa with Djibouti, which explains Ethiopian interest in an enclave either independent and neutral or controlled from Addis). Although Eritrea is "part" of Ethiopia, the Italians (from about 1935) and the British (from 1941 to 1952) helped to weaken ties that were never strong. Italy began the modernization process; and the British later allowed local political activity and hence consciousness, so that Eritrea acquired a distinct identity and never accepted its formal annexation into a feudal Ethiopia in 1962. Nonetheless, Addis did not take the opposition seriously until Eritrean liberation movements became active and secured outside help. By the late 1960's, they had adopted guerrilla tactics; and after the 1974 revolution and the confusion at the center of Ethiopia's empire, they prepared for larger-scale battle. As a strong Emperor was succeeded by a weak and inexperienced group of military leaders, demands for Eritrean autonomy grew; following repression, they became demands for independence.

Tens of thousands of Ethiopian soldiers, many of them conscripts, have died in vain attempts to impose Ethiopian rule over Eritrea since 1974. Given substantial Soviet military aid and Cuban and East European advisers, it is remarkable that Ethiopia has not been

¹Unless otherwise noted, quotations are taken from a variety of public materials, including Congressional hearings, the United States press, the *State Department Bulletin*, and *Africa Research Bulletin*. I am grateful to Bernd Schwieren for research assistance.

able to control Eritrean freedom fighters—themselves at times fighting pitched battles against each other. Without foreign military clout, Addis would probably not have any soldiers in the region.

The other problem for Ethiopia's leaders is Somali irredentism, which concerns the Ogaden, a large chunk of imperial territory. British and Italian rule over Somalia and the British administration of part of Ethiopia—liberated from Italy by South African troops after World War II—effectively enlarged the area controlled by Ethiopia and inhabited mostly by Somalis. (The British proposed a new entity uniting all Somalis, but nothing came of it.) The Ethiopian-Somali conflict underlies much of the behavior of the two states toward nations outside the Horn, including the superpowers.

Ethiopian "control" over the Ogaden, although intermittent, goes back many centuries, and Ethiopia takes the uncompromising position that Somali irredentism is illegitimate and a threat to regional peace. The Ogaden Somalis would probably prefer to be left alone, occasionally fighting over grazing and water rights; they view political, national boundaries as alien, and about a million Somalis fled to Somalia after the 1978 Ethiopian military victory and occupation.

After Soviet weapons and Cuban troops helped defeat Somalia in the Ogaden several times, Ethiopia stationed permanent troops in the province and supported Somali liberation movements. Three Somali dissident groups—the Salvation Front, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, and the small but ideologically oriented Workers party—merged in October, 1981, to form the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF). Colonel Abduhalli Yusuf Ahmed, one of many Somali opponents of the present government, is head of the SDSF, which is ethnically and regionally based (among the Issaq and in the Midjertein region) and thus has limited appeal in Somalia.

SDSF headquarters are in Addis, and the Ethiopian government allows it to operate a powerful radio transmitter, Radio Kulmis, from the outskirts of the Ethiopian capital. More to the point, Western intelligence and diplomatic sources believe that SDSF military units are being trained near Dire Dawa, some 100 miles from the Somali border; these units have conducted frequent raids into Somalia.

The Ethiopian economy is fragile; it depends largely on agriculture for home consumption and export earnings and is sensitive to domestic and external fluctuations. Annual per capita income is about \$100, and available resources cannot foot the bills for modernization and development, petroleum imports, and a large military budget simultaneously. The trade deficit has grown substantially—from \$210 million in 1978 to \$400 million in 1982. Short-range problems include a shortage of food staples and inadequate distribution, and the ever flourishing black market. If political prob-

lems can be contained, long-range prospects for agricultural self-sufficiency are good. Meanwhile, foreign aid helps to keep the economy going.

The Mengistu regime has made some progress, although political and economic costs are high and the regime depends on extraordinary external military help. Ethiopia may well reduce Eritrean secessionist demands to a nuisance rather than a danger. To help bring about a change in government or in policy in Somalia would be a major triumph, but to employ explicit intervention might be a Pyrrhic victory.

SOMALIA

Political developments in Somalia were punctuated in 1982 by severe discontent in the north (particularly in the Hargeisa and Burao areas), apparently focused on the Midjurtein region and the Isaaq clan but with overtones of unrequited economic expectations and a feeling of isolation from the "national" center at the capital city of Mogadishu. Discontent also reflected the north's British and the south's Italian colonial experience. At the end of 1982, it was not clear whether northern frustrations were being ameliorated or whether General Siad Barre's chances for continued rule were improving significantly.

The critical question concerned the armed forces: as the only structure capable of maintaining relative political stability, could it be shielded from the centrifugal forces inherent in Somali society? The answer was not apparent, but there were signs that President Barre's rule was shaky.

In January, the government summarily executed several senior officers for alleged cooperation with the externally based Somali Salvation Front (SOSAF). Most of the Eighth Army, stationed in seven garrisons in the north, mutinied shortly thereafter, but the mutiny was crushed. Despite heavy official censorship, it was evident that the fighting was fierce; government pronouncements denied the existence of a mutiny and attributed the trouble to Moscow and Addis Ababa and to "an irresponsible Reuters correspondent in Nairobi." The Somali News Agency dismissed the episode, noting only that security forces were sent to "disperse people."

Barre subsequently restructured some of the formal elements of the political system and tried to return the ruling political party to center stage. In the spring, he lifted martial law imposed in October, 1980; he reappointed General Mohamed Ali Samatar as Defense Minister and shifted Cabinet members to give his close supporters greater responsibility. He sought—and received—American political support during a three-day official visit to the United States in March, 1982.

In Washington, Barre described Somali-American relations by suggesting that the "atmospherics are excellent" and managed to conceal his disappointment that he did not receive more tangible, immediate re-

wards—although he appreciated the symbolism of the visit to Mogadishu of the United States cruiser *John Hancock* to coincide with his return from the United States. The press reported an attempt to overthrow Barre in June, 1982, involving a number of Cabinet members including highly placed but disgruntled military leaders. The former Defense Minister, General Umar Hadji Masaleh, demoted to Health Minister following an attempted coup in April, was also involved in June.

The July, 1982, Ethiopian attack produced a rise in Somali nationalist sentiment, and was certainly not welcomed by the international community. Perhaps the SDSF, bolstered by Libyan funds, had persuaded Mengistu that disaffection in northern and central Somalia was ripe for a politically inspired military foray. At year's end, however, the evidence suggested that the attack was a mistake, although not all returns were in. The event reverberated beyond the Horn into southern Africa, the Middle East, and the United States. Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, in his capacity as chairman of the OAU (Organization of African Unity), called on both countries to cease firing, thus explicitly blaming the Ethiopian government—with which Kenya has a defense agreement against Somalia—for violating Somalia's sovereignty and territory.

African reactions were of some significance and may help cool tempers. Despite the history of Somali incursions into Ethiopia, the Ethiopian attack could not be condoned. Djibouti, a small state squeezed between two larger neighbors, announced its continued neutrality and called for a cease-fire. Egypt and the Sudan strongly condemned Ethiopia, no doubt reflecting inter-Arab solidarity and a generally pro-Western orientation. An Arab summit meeting resolved to "help drive out the Ethiopian forces"; although it had no effect on the situation in the field, this action was interpreted as a Somali diplomatic victory. The Ethiopians had perhaps painted themselves into a corner.

President Barre subsequently asked the United States to make available some of the military equipment it had agreed to provide but had held since 1980. Washington's response was swift but limited. It airlifted the better part of \$10-million worth of defensive equipment, mostly radar, anti-aircraft weapons, transportation and communications equipment and small arms. This was a symbolic gesture, in harmony with Africa's opposition to military solutions for border disputes.

SOMALIA'S ECONOMY

Somalia is one of the world's poorest countries with a per capita annual income below \$200.00. The five year economic plan introduced by the government in January, 1982, regards the north and the south as distinct entities. In the south, major emphasis will be

placed on harnessing the Juba River, flowing south from the Ethiopian highlands into the arid lowlands near the Kenya border. A \$650-million dam for irrigation and electric power is under construction at Bardera. Trade with Kenya has been growing, and the government plans to introduce regular commercial shipping service between Mogadishu and Mombasa and to modernize the harbor, which is frequently clogged with traffic.

The government also hopes that the very large salt deposits about 120 kilometers north of Mogadishu will act as a development center. These deposits have not been worked since 1939 and need capital investment, and the vexing question of a market outlet has not yet been settled—Japan has indicated some interest. Some external assistance contributes to the development of the south, including French funds for a cement plant near the Juba dam, and a contribution by the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development for completion of a road (a project that has run into cost overruns and other difficulties).

About three-fourths of the Somali people raise stock for a living and contribute about 80 percent of the country's foreign exchange earnings. Yet there are indications of some subsoil mineral deposits (Somalia sponsored a trade fair in Houston, Texas, in September, to tempt investors); because most of these are in the isolated north, their commercial exploitation could make an important contribution to the social, economic and political unity of the country. Oil exploration has not yet met with commercial success but is being continued. Significant deposits of natural gas were found about 40 miles north of Mogadishu, in addition to deposits of uranium, meerschaum, nickel, bauxite, iron ore, tin, and chromite.

Despite these possibilities, the official development plan for the north placed great emphasis on the growth of the fishing industry. From the point of view of domestic consumption, this is a difficult task, because most people prefer meat and milk products. But the prospects for exports seem reasonable. The present catch is negligible; the government plans to build ten fishing ports as initial infrastructure along the 4,000-kilometer coastline and estimates a potential catch of some 200,000 tons per year.

General Siad Barre is a survivor and a skillful politician. Yet the obstacles he faces are formidable. He has suffered repeated military defeats by Ethiopia; hence the image of a Greater Somalia has been shattered. Somalia sustained a national humiliation in the summer of 1982; there is disaffection in the north and possibly the central region. Barre has an increasingly narrowing power base and is currently unable to extract more than token support from the United States; thus he may well become the victim of a combination of domestic and external factors.

The Republic of Djibouti is a small former French

territory which derives signal benefits from its strategic location; its economy is the most promising in the Horn in the short and medium term. The country is slightly larger than Massachusetts and has a population numbering about 350,000 (less than Alaska). The people are about equally divided among Issa of Somali origin and Afar, whose ties are with Ethiopia. Most Issa live in the country, whereas urban centers, chiefly the capital city of Djibouti, are dominated by Afar. Political leaders must maintain a reasonable ethnic balance and give the two groups the impression that their interests are served by remaining an independent political entity. A new legislature was elected in May, 1982; the ruling single party chose the candidates, and the results were seen as strengthening President Hassan Gouled Aptidon.

DJIBOUTI'S ECONOMY

Fortunately for Djibouti, its economic situation and immediate prospects are favorable. The 1981 national budget was balanced and supplemented by a good balance of payments. The country's location at the southern tip of the Red Sea lends itself to economic and strategic exploitation. The government helped create a climate favorable to private enterprise, and points out that the presence of several thousand French troops helps make the country the safest in the Horn.

Most of the people are pastoral nomads, difficult to integrate into or mobilize for national economic development objectives. The country's economic future lies less in agriculture than in strengthening its role as an entrepôt for regional trade.

Generous government policies attracted banking and contributed to making the national currency a safe and desirable medium of exchange. It may be traded freely for other currencies, and transactions can remain secret; Djibouti would like to become Africa's Switzerland. Banking serves mostly as a base for the short-term financing of trade for customers in Ethiopia, Somalia, and both South and North Yemen. Flexible policies contrast sharply with the lumbering, nit-picking and morose bureaucracies of other states in the area.

Land prices in Djibouti have begun to climb in anticipation of an economic boom. The capital city's port, somewhat ineffectual because it is clogged on occasion, is being modernized and expanded; by the end of 1983, it should serve as the major container terminal and distribution center in the Horn and beyond. The international airport will also be expanded and modernized.

As a result of these policies, Djibouti attracts external investment and foreign aid. Yet it remains one of the world's poorest states. It has applied for United Nations recognition as a least developed state to qualify for more aid, and the government plans to undertake

a population census to "prove" that its annual average per capita income is significantly lower than the United Nations estimate of \$400.00.

INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE

The Horn's importance in international affairs derives chiefly from its geographic location at the juncture of black and Arab Africa, the southern end of the Red Sea, the western flank of the Indian Ocean, and its proximity to the Persian Gulf. The basis for its importance has hardly changed from the days of imperial "coaling stations"; since World War II, Britain and France have been supplanted by the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, Soviet interests and activities are increasing, whereas those of the United States are waning.

The Soviet Union has not been too successful in its adventures in the Horn. It helped create and then defeat a Somali military threat, as Moscow changed its definition of Soviet national interests. While Moscow was arming Somalia, it was also supporting Eritrean liberation movements and was thoroughly familiar with General Barre's commitment to a Greater Somalia. By switching its alliances from Somalia to Ethiopia, Moscow "traded up"; Ethiopia is the larger power and Soviet influence was increased accordingly. The abrupt Soviet switch in allies was not in harmony with Soviet ideological rationalizations about its obligations to support national liberation movements in the third world, particularly in view of the fact that the leaders of both the African states claimed to be Marxist. Today the Soviet Union is silent about self-determination in Eritrea and aspirations for a Greater Somalia, or refer to them as capitalist plots.

The Soviet image has been tarnished for other reasons. First, the Soviet Union's credibility as a reliable military ally was sharply questioned when Somalia was abandoned for a larger prize. Second, it remains to be seen if Soviet leaders are willing to use massive transfusions of military aid elsewhere in Africa; there are few Ogadens in Africa, and Eritrea is closer to Czechoslovakia than Afghanistan as an analogy. Third, Moscow's repeated efforts to restructure Ethiopian society reveal blatant insensitivity toward the third world (reminiscent of its attempt to unseat President Sékou Touré in Guinea in 1961) and have been met with polite but clear resistance by the proud Ethiopians.

Fourth, if the Soviet Union supports Ethiopian

(Continued on page 137)

Walter Skurnik is a frequent contributor to journals on African affairs and is the author of "The Military in Dahomey," in Claude E. Welch, ed., *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), *Foreign Policy of Senegal* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), and *International Relations: Sub Saharan Africa* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1977).

"It is tragic that Angola has had to spend the material and human resources at its disposal to survive the machinations of a larger East-West confrontation and the violence of a neighboring battle for independence."

The Continuing Crisis in Angola

BY GERALD J. BENDER

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ANGOLA's independence in 1975 brought the struggle for self-determination in southern Africa one step closer to Namibia and two steps from the redoubtable Republic of South Africa. The Angolan civil war immediately preceding independence was more than an internal affair; it attracted widespread intervention and actually marked a crucial turning point in East-West relations. During its first seven years of independence, Angola has continued to be a focus of East-West strategic maneuvering and a vital link in the struggle for and negotiations over the independence of neighboring Namibia.

The losing side in the civil war has continued to wage a guerrilla war against the Angolan government in central and southeastern Angola, while South Africa wreaks havoc in Angola's southern provinces as revenge for Angola's harboring the Namibian guerrilla nationalist group, SWAPO (South-West African People's Organization). Oil, diamonds, copper, iron ore, and other vital minerals provide Angolans with the highest per capita income in black Africa (\$495). But unfortunately, nearly two-thirds of the budget is spent on war. All other expenditures are secondary.

Surprisingly, given the longevity and prominence of the various wars in Angola, very little is known or understood about their impact on Angola's struggle for viable nationhood.

For centuries, Angola was an enigmatic, unknown quantity on the African continent. Its history under Portuguese colonialism was known to outsiders largely through the eyes of Lisbon, a vision basically taken at face value. Angola's position as a penal colony in the Portuguese overseas empire, Portugal's later attempt to establish a more viable presence through white settlement, and its false claims to have established a racial democracy seldom attracted the interest or attention of the rest of the world.

With the outbreak of the war of national liberation in 1961, journalists, scholars, and diplomats began to visit and write about Angola. Yet diametrically opposed interpretations of Angola's colonial history (especially race relations) were not uncommon. Three major liberation movements (MPLA-People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA-

Angolan National Liberation Front, and UNITA-National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) evolved during the independence struggle, which further confused attempts to understand Angolan realities.

Part of the confusion and misunderstanding over the Angolan civil war resulted from the political and ideological diversity of the support the movements attracted. The FNLA/UNITA alliance received assistance not only from the United States, France, and Britain, but also from the People's Republic of China, Romania, North Korea, and South Africa. Some observers saw this alliance as "pro-Western"; others called it "pro-Chinese." The Marxist MPLA, on the other hand, secured support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, Sweden, Denmark, Nigeria, and the former Katangese Gendarmes (once loyal to Zairian Prime Minister Moise Tshombe). To many, this was the "pro-Soviet" side; others considered it to be the "non-aligned" side.

In fact, none of these movements could be legitimately or intelligently defined by the ideology of their outside patrons. Each was an expression of internal Angolan differences—e.g., ethnolinguistic, regional, racial and other domestic factors.

Unfortunately, distorted perceptions not only stymied a negotiated settlement of the civil war, but have inhibited efforts toward national reconciliation during the more than seven years since Angolan independence was declared on November 11, 1975. The ruling MPLA and its supporters view UNITA as a puppet and creature of South Africa and assume that UNITA will wither away when its umbilical link with Pretoria is severed. UNITA and its supporters portray the governing MPLA as a Soviet/Cuban puppet which they assume will collapse as soon as Havana's troops leave Angola. Although neither perception is correct, each side sees a settlement in Namibia as the key to ending the "puppet" connection of its adversary.

From its origins in the late 1950's until its demise in 1978, the FNLA remained an almost exclusively Kikongo ethnic movement based in Zaire. (The Kikongo represent just under 20 percent of Angola's population.) This party and its leader, Holden Roberto, were

nearly always dependent on the largess and logistical support provided for more than two decades by various Zairian regimes. Following the second invasion of Zaire's Shaba province in the spring of 1978 by the former Katangese Gendarmes based in Angola, Zaire's President Sese Seko Mobutu decided that it would be wise to try to get along with his southern neighbor, hoping to prevent a Shaba III. Angolan President Agostinho Neto proposed a rapprochement with his Zairian counterpart, offering to curb the activities of the Katangese and begin their repatriation if Mobutu would do the same vis-à-vis the FNLA. Mobutu agreed, expelled Roberto (who has since been living in exile in France), cut off further support for the FNLA, and closed down its bases. This amounted to a virtual death blow to the movement.

Remnants of the FNLA subsequently opened a new guerrilla organization, COMIRA, which occasionally carries out ambushes and lays mines in northern Angola, but it has proved to be little more than a nuisance. Angolan leaders through 1982 were convinced that Mobutu himself did not support or assist COMIRA, although some Zairian military commanders along the border have provided logistical assistance in return for bribes.

Of more concern to the Angolan government is Zaire's position vis-à-vis UNITA and its leader, Jonas Savimbi. Some UNITA officials operate in Kinshasa, and Zaire has allowed planes to land in its territory knowing that they will transport foreign journalists and UNITA cadres into Angola. But, although Savimbi spent a week in Kinshasa in early 1982 and met once with Mobutu, there still appears to be no active Zairian support for his movement. Angolan leaders monitor this activity closely and are apparently well-informed about the extent of Zairian contacts with UNITA. They have privately threatened to retaliate (Shaba III?) if they perceive an escalation in Zairian-UNITA activity. The rapprochement is still in effect but each side is uneasy about the intentions of the other and the situation attracts careful attention by interested parties.

One vitally important reason for COMIRA/FNLA's inability to sustain more than occasional attacks is linked to the MPLA's little noticed effort to incorporate into the party and the government peoples from northern Angola who have traditionally opposed the MPLA. In the past, the MPLA projected an image of being composed principally of the Kimbundu peoples and mestiços; the Kimbundu make up just under one-fourth of the population while mestiços comprise only about one percent of the total population.

In fact, the top leadership was traditionally drawn overwhelmingly from these two groups. For example, in October, 1976 (six months after the end of the civil war) the MPLA Political Bureau consisted of 6 Kimbundus, 3 mestiços and 2 northerners (1 Kikongo and

1 Cabindan). Exactly three years later, following the death of President Neto, the MPLA Political Bureau contained 4 Kimbundus, 2 mestiços, and 5 northerners (3 Kikongos and 2 Cabindans). This ethnic composition was maintained through the end of 1982, although some of the individuals were changed.

Moreover, in recent years, many Kikongo who returned to Angola from Zaire were given important positions in the government, university, party and other sectors. This rapid and profound integration of northerners is one of the MPLA's most impressive accomplishments since independence. At the same time, the numerical importance of whites and mestiços in the party has greatly diminished. Today, mestiços (6) and whites (1) make up only 10 percent of the 65-member central committee.

The two major factors which contributed to the demise of the FNLA in northern Angola (i.e., the loss of an external patron and MPLA co-option) have not played a role with respect to UNITA and its main supporters, the Ovimbundu, who comprise about one-third of the Angolan population. Today less than 10 percent of the MPLA central committee are Ovimbundu and only one is to be found in the Cabinet. Moreover, UNITA's principal external patron, South Africa, has greatly augmented its support over the past three years to the point that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between South African and UNITA's military operations in southern and southeastern Angola. In central Angola, UNITA operates more or less autonomously from the South Africans but the level of combat there is considerably lower than that found in the south and southeast.

Following the establishment of the MPLA government after the civil war, the army commanders, still flush with victory, assured President Neto that remaining "pockets" of UNITA resistance would be cleaned out in no time. In 1976 and 1977, the MPLA had some success, but UNITA proved to be considerably more than a few pockets of "bandits," as the MPLA preferred to describe them. Gradually, the MPLA came to realize that the struggle had to be waged not only with guns but with food and shelter as well in order to win over UNITA supporters. Yet such an effort presupposed that the Luanda government would have the food, clothing, and other essential items to send into the contested zones as part of a strategy of winning over the population.

Given the shortages in virtually all essentials which have plagued the government and caused long lines in the capital itself for buying meat and clothing, it is

(Continued on page 128)

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KENYA'S YEAR OF DISCONTENT

(Continued from page 105)

and treason trials. Between September and November, there were no dramatic revelations. Six hundred airmen were given sentences ranging from a half-year to 22 years; and one man was sentenced to death for treason. Several civilians were also accused of treason. But there were some puzzling elements, like the early sacking and arrest of the Kikuyu head of the police Special Branch.

Late in November, evidence was brought forward that a wider group was involved and that some senior air force officers and the secret service knew of the planned coup. The degree of involvement of Luos is also an enigma. The head of the self-styled "People's Redemption Committee," who fled to Tanzania in an air force jet, was a Luo private. Several prominent Luo civilians were arrested for treason (they included Odinga's son, Raila Odinga; an editor of the *Standard*, Otieno Mak'Onyango; and the Minister for Information and Broadcasting, Peter Oloo Aringo). Odinga himself was placed under increasing restraint, and by November he was under house arrest.

Whether Luo were central to the plot is in considerable question, however, and the régime's use of what one observer called the "soft option of antagonizing the Luo" by targeting Luo critics, rendering the group scapegoats for Kenya's political ills once again, could lead to future costs in terms of Luo disaffection.

In spite of the tensions surrounding the unraveling of the plot, Kenya's constitutional machinery operated smoothly in the prosecution of the government's case, and the political life of the nation resumed its tempo. The upcoming party elections preoccupied all politicians, because the outcome would establish positions of relative advantage in the national elections that are likely in two years' time.

Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the coup, Moi's actions indicated important shifts in strategy. He cautiously pulled back from his usual involvement with close political allies. Cabinet meetings were suspended; and ministers found it harder to gain an audience with him. Ministers accompanying him at functions no longer received individual mention in press and radio announcements. At the same time, the President endeavored to return to the populist politics of his first years in office, appealing directly to the *wananchi* (citizens—literally, "children of the soil") at public rallies and functions, and warning them to be wary of the "big men," who "can afford to cause problems because they have the means to escape from the problems they cause. When trouble comes, it is the small man who suffers."¹¹ Further, he urged *wananchi* to take the con-

trol of party politics out of the hands of party officials by using their votes to reject leaders who had failed them.

The populist appeal was accompanied by moves toward a shake-up of the civil service and a new crackdown on corruption in the government. Significantly, the working party named to draw up a code of conduct for public servants included no senior party officials or top civil servants.

The university came in for retaliation as well. Moi had always been uneasy about the intelligentsia, and the students' involvement on August 1, although apparently unpremeditated, gave him an excuse for a crackdown. At first, he planned to disband and reconstitute the university, but in November, he undertook a more realistic review and reorganization. Whatever the reforms in store, it was clear the social sciences in particular would not again be allowed a free hand in the design and content of curriculum.

Finally, Moi regarded the coup attempt as an indication of the need for dramatic attention to the faltering economy. Britain and the United States responded to appeals for additional assistance in bridging the 1982 balance of payments deficit, but they sought assurances that Kenya would preserve its democratic institutions as a condition of such support. The United States was particularly concerned in view of its increasingly close ties with Kenya in recent years. Specifically, the United States has been relying on Kenya as an Indian Ocean base, and in return for this has been supplying money and equipment for Kenya's armed forces. It was also anxious to see the air force reorganized.

The IMF, for its part, wanted to ensure Kenya's compliance with its conditions before it would release the second half of a \$165-million standby credit. A program was drawn up and presented in October to fulfill one of the conditions: drastic cuts in public expenditures. A major recommendation of the working party on financial reform was that the government should divest itself of investments in commercial and industrial enterprises. But it is questionable whether the government could act on this suggestion or could fulfill other IMF conditions, like the liberalization of import policies. Private sources of investment are inadequate to take over government investments, and Kenya lacks the foreign reserves to ease import restrictions.

Further, as Africa's top financiers have indicated in the Lagos Plan of Action, an Organization of African Unity-backed African economic development policy statement, the World Bank's policies do not address the external causes of Africa's economic problems, while the domestic reform that is a condition of World Bank or IMF aid protects external trade at the expense of internal self-reliance.¹² At a time when Western nations are tending toward increasing protectionism—as

¹¹Weekly Review, September 18, 1982.

¹²The Lagos Plan of Action was adopted by the OAU heads of state in April, 1980.

the controversies at the 1982 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) meetings indicated—insistence on such externally oriented economic policies appears all the more illogical. The fundamental contradiction that Kenya (like other African countries) faces is that compliance with IMF conditions will lead to a spiraling cycle of debt and dependency; and non-compliance offers no solution either, because it would deprive the country of urgently needed capital to maintain production. Either option offers only further impoverishment.

CONCLUSION

Ethnic groups and classes find themselves in a confusing complexity in Kenya's political drama. The hidden agenda of the past year's political maneuvering has been the issue of Moi's continued leadership, an issue that has been sharpened by the attempt to achieve by force what political rivals are seeking through constitutional channels. That Moi has carefully read the mood of the nation is evident from his actions; that these actions are contradictory is a reflection of the contradictions inherent in Kenya's political and economic life. The distance he put between himself and his rivals in the February, 1982, Cabinet reshuffle was increased following the coup. On the one hand, to secure himself against uncertainty, he drew loyal armed forces closely around him; on the other, he reached out for an ideological alliance with the middle classes. The aim of the alliance was to create enough political force to control opposition within government at the top. But the vocal middle classes proved difficult allies; witness the events involving the party and the university, and the coup attempt itself.

Above all, anger at the accumulation of wealth by those at the top, particularly the members of government, could not be restrained. In spite of the moves to silence back-bench criticism and the use of detention against intellectuals, the "Luo opposition" and others (and despite the heightened tension created by the interjection of violence into the Kenyan political equation), parliamentarians continued to speak out about the "sinful accumulation of wealth in the country," and the press continued to report their utterances. Moi's populism thus had a less liberal tone than it had in 1978, as he turned to the very tactics of the Kenyatta regime that he had abolished to stifle dissent. The coup attempt merely provided the justification.

The likelihood is great that frustrations will increase, tempting the regime to use further repressive tactics. The current generation of educated or entrepreneurially inclined Kenyans do not have the opportunities that their fathers did. The great class mobilization of the 1960's, based as it was on the opportunities for accumulation provided by the state and by departing Asians and Europeans, has slowed to a halt. Increasingly, different middle class factions, who could afford

to squabble in prosperous times, are uniting in the refrain against overwhelming state power and unequal access to the nation's resources. But the press, intellectuals, parliamentarians and small businessmen, existing as they do at the grace of the state, are susceptible to the populist, nationalist appeals of the President, whose peaceful survival in office is a sine qua non of their continued well-being. The tension between the middle classes and the state is thus papered over.

Moreover, the state's survival depends on the continued functioning of the experienced government leaders, who come from the upper classes and are frustrating middle class ambitions. The struggle over national resources thus emerges at the ideological level in a more manageable form—that of racial or ethnic conflict—with Asians and Luos the perennial scapegoats for economic and political tensions.

And what of Kenya's fabled entrepreneurial class? There is a division between the Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu elite, and the Kikuyu elite itself remains divided. Members of the Kenyatta "family," who were the scions of indigenous capitalist enterprise, are attempting a political comeback through alliances with the grassroots in Kiambu. They face challenges from the new non-Kikuyu elite from Rift Valley Province, who are seeking to use the perquisites of the state to establish their position as the Kikuyu did in the 1960's and early 1970's. The non-Kiambu Kikuyu elite, which has firm alliances with the upper echelons of government and stands for the export-oriented "rational" economic policies advocated by the IMF, continues to see its interests supported by the government. But because these policies are inherently unable to solve the country's economic ills and because Moi has carefully circumscribed the group's chief spokesman, Kibaki, this elite is not able to act forcefully.

Further, the question as to whether Kikuyu patience with a non-Kikuyu President will run out remains moot. The Kikuyu need Moi to provide stability and continuity: Moi, in turn, needs the entrepreneurial and administrative skills of the substantial Kikuyu presence in government and business to maintain the political and economic viability of the state.

The remaining actor is the military. Kenya's forces are small compared to other African countries: it had only 15,000 men under arms in 1982, compared to 45,000 in Tanzania, for example. But, as President Milton Obote learned in Uganda (when he used the army to solve political problems after the Baganda uprising in 1966), an army out of the barracks can dramatically change the political equation. The press was bold enough to assert on August 4 that "an elected government, no matter how corrupt or bad, is in most cases preferable to a military junta." Whether the military itself will be content to agree with this, in the face of the current regime's political and economic impotence, remains to be seen. ■

ANGOLA

(Continued from page 125)

not surprising that few items reach the bush hundreds of miles away. This inability of the MPLA to "deliver" essential material support to the population in central and southern Angola probably accounts more for the maintenance and growth of UNITA support than any ethnic or ideological appeal that Savimbi and his party may represent.

UNITA's military strength has been centered in eastern and southeastern Angola, which were also the main sites of its operations against the Portuguese between 1967 and 1974. These regions are the least populated (approximately 5 percent of Angola's population with less than one person per square kilometer) and most economically depressed in the country (once dubbed "the end of the world" by the Portuguese). The MPLA has been unable to dislodge UNITA from this area, which is also where the latter's military activities are most closely coordinated with South Africa.

The limited prospects for a UNITA military victory came as a surprise to many in the administration of Ronald Reagan once they probed Angola's internal realities. The most sobering appraisal of all came from none other than UNITA's Savimbi himself who, in December, 1981, shocked then Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr. when he stated that his troops could not militarily defeat the governing MPLA "with or without the Cubans." He added that the best he could hope for was a coalition between the two parties. During the latter half of 1982, thanks in part to South Africa passing on a portion of the more than \$200 million worth of military equipment captured during their 1981 summer invasion, UNITA managed to expand considerably northward along the eastern border, close to the areas near the diamond mines. The party also marked its first sustained attacks north of the Benguela Railway (near Malange). Yet these developments did not fundamentally alter Savimbi's assessment to Haig. UNITA remains a long way from displacing the MPLA. Moreover, UNITA could probably exist in Angola for years even if all South African support were withdrawn. Clearly, then, neither side can realistically entertain prospects of a total defeat of the other in the near or distant future. Ultimately, a solution to the fighting in Angola must be political.

South Africa's policy of aggression toward Angola has been the stumbling block to a political solution of Angola's internal struggle. Pretoria's strategy of violence with respect to Angola incorporates four types of activities: (1) To attack SWAPO camps in southern Angola which contain armed and/or civilian Namibians; (2) To arm, finance, and logically assist UNITA in its fight against the MPLA government; (3) To carry out sabotage against major and minor economic tar-

gets; (4) to bomb, invade and occupy important parts of southern Angola.

Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos, in a speech (November 11, 1982) commemorating the seventh anniversary of Angolan independence, charged that South Africa has caused over \$10-billion worth of "material damage" in Angola since 1975. The accuracy of his estimates cannot be fully judged because he provides no breakdown of that damage. Yet, even if one assumed that dos Santos exaggerated by a factor of three (which is highly doubtful), the material damage would still be several billions of dollars.

The conventional wisdom—shared by many in the Reagan administration—holds that South African attacks actually promote Angolan reconciliation because their cessation can be bargained with the MPLA as the price for a reconciliation with UNITA. This erroneous belief, like so much of the conventional wisdom about Angola over the past decade, is based on a misperception of Angolan reality. It is not only incorrect but dangerous because it encourages some (including Pretoria) to add a second Angolan linkage to any settlement in Namibia: (1) expel the Cuban combat troops and (2) force a reconciliation with UNITA. If either or both these linkages are prerequisites for a South African withdrawal from Namibia, then there will be no settlement.

There is a corollary—the longer South African pressure continues against Angola, the more dissension it causes among the factions within the MPLA. Ultimately, it is argued, the so-called moderate faction, which allegedly favors immediate reconciliation with UNITA, will see that the only hope for peace is to overthrow the so-called hardliners and will therefore carry out a coup. This view (prevalent in high circles in both Pretoria and Washington) again illustrates a misperception of Angolan reality, this time in a misreading of the factions in the MPLA. While there are fluid factions in the party over many issues, nearly total consensus prevails over one—reconciliation will be dealt with only after South African support for UNITA greatly attenuates or ceases, not before.

This position should not surprise those familiar with negotiations. The MPLA is no more anxious to negotiate with UNITA while it carries its South African baggage to the table than UNITA is interested in negotiating with the MPLA and its Cuban baggage. Yet the MPLA maintains that it will not ask the Cuban troops to leave until South Africa ceases its attacks against Angola, while UNITA insists that there can be no cease-fire or peace until the Cubans leave. Pretoria holds the key. And South Africa has shown no interest in seeing a reconciliation in Angola; on the contrary, it has been the greatest enemy of attempts at reconciliation.

Three successive United States administrations, led
(Continued on page 138)

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF ZIMBABWE

(Continued from page 109)

to provide \$8.5 million over a three-year period to help provide family planning and fertility centers.

How government officials react to acts of violence both from within and from without the country will probably determine the world's perception of Zimbabwe more than the success or failure of its economic and social programs. In a peculiar way, however, the government's response to security problems is related to its economic reform. Those officials who are frustrated with the slow pace of reform efforts push for sterner action toward opposition party members, black and white, and the government cooperates, hoping to appease the more radical elements in the party and the government.

In 1980, when ZANU-PF came to power, it extended the emergency powers regulations that had kept many of its present leaders in detention for years during the regime of Prime Minister Smith. Under the constitution adopted at the Lancaster House conference in 1979, Parliament may extend the emergency powers regulations for six-month periods if it believes there is an internal or external threat to national security.

When Minister of Home Affairs Ushewokunze presented Parliament with the government's motion to renew the state of emergency in July, 1982, he said that the power of the people needed strengthening because it is "being replaced by the power of selfish individuals and by the power of international forces operating behind them." Among other enemies of the state, he cited bandits in Matabeleland, attackers on the Prime Minister's residence, and the government of South Africa. He also accused the judicial system of "sowing seeds of a revolt against the government," calling the 10 white and 2 black appellate court judges:

recalcitrant and reactionary members of the so-called Bench still . . . masquerading under our hard-won independence as dispensers of justice or, shall I say, of injustice by handing down perverted pieces of judgment which smack of subverting the people's government.¹⁵

¹⁵Minister of Home Affairs Herbert Ushewokunze, *The Hansard*, July 13, 1982, cols. 631 and 632. His verbal attack on the courts was apparently only his opening salvo. In August, Ushewokunze defied the High Court by refusing to produce for the court (or even to disclose the whereabouts) of two white farmers, Noel and Alan York, whose release had been ordered by the court. Once released, the Yorks were immediately redetained on Ushewokunze's orders. A major clash between Ushewokunze and the courts was averted when Prime Minister Mugabe intervened and ordered Ushewokunze to obey the court.

¹⁶Minister of State (Defense) in the Prime Minister's Office Sydney Sekeramayi, *The Herald*, October 9, 1982, p. 1.

The Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulation and the Emergency Powers (Security Forces Indemnity) Regulation were renewed for six months by a parliamentary majority. The Maintenance of Law and Order legislation enables the police, the army and the security forces to hold an individual in preventive detention for long periods without trial. The Security Forces Indemnity regulations permit the Minister of Defense, currently the Prime Minister, to indemnify himself, the President, the Cabinet or any member of the security forces against criminal or civil charges for an action taken to further the preservation of the state's security, retroactive to 1980.

Extension of the emergency powers regulations has also enabled the government to bypass Parliament to enact such nonemergency items as a rent freeze, a minimum wage, a prohibition on the dismissal of workers, and price ceilings on certain consumer goods. Although the government has used its emergency powers for major social and economic changes, the loudest protest over the use of these powers comes from whites and from minority party blacks who complain about the number of people detained and their treatment by security officials. In charge of police and security as Home Affairs Minister, Ushewokunze refused a parliamentary request to reveal the number of people in detention. However, in October, Minister of State (Defense) Sydney Sekeramayi reported that the police and army had captured 425 dissidents in the Bulawayo area, and declared that the dissident problem was caused by "certain ZAPU and former ZIPRA members."¹⁶ In this context, a dissident is a former member of ZIPRA, the military wing of Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), who either never joined the Zimbabwe Republic Army which is made up of former ZANLA (ZANU troops), ZIPRA, and Rhodesian forces, or who has deserted the national army and has returned to Matabeleland and engages in violence.

The animosity and distrust between Mugabe and ZANU-PF, on the one hand, and Nkomo and ZAPU, on the other, have their roots in the early days of the liberation struggle. Today, Mugabe accuses Nkomo supporters of plotting against the government, and Nkomo accuses Mugabe of discrediting him in order to proceed more quickly toward a one-party state.

When Minister of State Sekeramayi addressed Parliament, he reiterated the government's accusation that during the 1979 cease-fire, ZAPU hid large quantities of arms rather than turn them in as ZANU had done. The discovery in February, 1982, of a large arms cache buried on ZAPU-owned farms in the Bulawayo area triggered the dismissal of Nkomo (who was then Minister without Portfolio) and two other ZAPU ministers from the Cabinet. Two ZIPRA military leaders, Lieutenant General Lookout Masuku and General Dumiso Dabengwa, were detained and subsequently charged

with high treason for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government.

Nkomo's dismissal from the Cabinet precipitated unrest among his supporters in Matabeleland. In June, the Prime Minister's home was sprayed by automatic rifle fire (ZAPU member of Parliament Vote Moyo and 16 others have been detained for their alleged role in the attack) and in July a group of about 12 armed men kidnapped six foreign tourists in Matabeleland and demanded the release of Dabengwa and Masuku in exchange for the tourists.

Nkomo's dismissal also precipitated many defections from the integrated armed forces. No official figure has been given for the total number of men who defected, but Western newspapers claim that more than 4,500 soldiers left the 60,000-member national army and that most of them were former ZIPRA soldiers who returned to Matabeleland for fear of being accused of taking part in the alleged ZAPU conspiracy to overthrow the government.¹⁷ In October, Defense Minister Sekeramayi announced that two entire battalions of the national army had been disbanded because their members were "in collusion with armed dissidents operating in the country."¹⁸

Dissent in the armed forces involves not only former ZIPRA members but also members of the former Rhodesian Forces who were also integrated into the national armed forces. The government suspects that many white officers are in collusion with South Africa. In August, 1982, at Thornhill, the nation's major air base, saboteurs damaged 11 air force planes, including four recently delivered Hawk jet fighters valued at about \$45 million. As of December, six senior air force officers, all of them white, remain in custody for questioning. Lawyers representing two of the officers have accused the security forces of torturing their clients. The lawyers in turn were arrested and then released on bail for speaking publicly about national security matters.

In August, Mugabe's accusations of South African involvement in attempts to destabilize the Zimbabwe government were substantiated. Three white former Rhodesian soldiers serving in the South African Defense Forces (SADF) were shot and killed in the Sengwe communal area near Zimbabwe's southern border with Mozambique. South African Defense Force Chief General Constand Viljoen admitted that the men were members of SADF, but he said that they were on "an unauthorized mission."¹⁹ Zimbabwe government officials believe that the men were on an authorized mission to Mozambique to join the Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR) and that

¹⁷Senator M. Partridge, *The Hansard* (Harare: The Senate, October 5, 1982), col. 785.

¹⁸*The Herald*, October 9, 1982, p. 1.

¹⁹"Mystery of Bodies Deepening," *The Star*, September 11, 1982, p. 3.

they were planning to blow up the Nyala rail line that runs from Maputo Harbor through the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe.

Operating in Mozambique, the MNR was originally set up by the Rhodesian army with South African assistance to help the Portuguese government in Mozambique fight against the guerrillas in the liberation struggle in the early 1970's. Today, according to Mozambique officials, the MNR operates with South African support to undermine the government of Samora Machel in Mozambique and to destabilize the economies of neighboring Malawi and Zimbabwe.

The MNR operates in the northern area of Mozambique and frequently destroys sections of the rail line and oil pipeline that run from Beira, Mozambique, on the Indian Ocean to Mutare (Umtali) in the Eastern Highlands of Zimbabwe. Because the pipeline is landlocked Zimbabwe's lifeline for petroleum imports, 2,000 Zimbabwean troops guard the line in Mozambique; nonetheless, the MNR continues to blow up sections of the line and, in December, destroyed about 35 petrol storage tanks in Mozambique. The resulting petrol shortage has led to hardships in Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe's economic success is of considerable importance to the other black nations of southern Africa and to the blacks of South Africa as well. Zimbabwe has the transportation network, the communications facilities and the potential to serve as the region's economic hub. As a food exporter, Zimbabwe can help lessen the surrounding nations' dependence on South Africa for food. In addition, Zimbabwe's economic success will facilitate its program of reconciliation between white and black; thus Zimbabwe will serve as a model for South Africa's blacks and whites.

South Africa's interest, on the other hand, lies in maintaining ties with the surrounding countries in order to keep them economically dependent and thus politically subservient. South Africa's role as a provider is supplemented by its military strength; it is thus powerful enough to outlaw the African National Congress (ANC) and to prevent the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) from establishing bases of operations.

The Zimbabwean government proceeds cautiously and pragmatically with its program to reconstruct the society from the ashes of colonialism and racism. The implementation of its plan for transformation depends in part on the world economy and especially on the worldwide demand for minerals. The plan's success also depends on the rains; another season of poor rains will further imperil the country's cattle herd and will exacerbate food shortages in the southern region.

Politically, ZANU-PF enjoys broad-based support. Detentions without trial and accusations of human rights violations nonetheless cloud Zimbabwe's otherwise promising start. Internationally, the country remains firmly nonaligned; but South Africa still threatens Zimbabwe's future as an independent nation. ■

REVOLUTION AND THE MILITARY IN GHANA

(Continued from page 119)

Lack of military discipline and brutality against civilians have again become major issues of the Catholic and Protestant churches.

Fourth, it is clear that military factions have formed. Sergeant Akata-Pore's apparent base of support among northern Ghanaian military personnel was the source of his challenge to Rawlings in a major confrontation on October 28-29, 1982, and in the attempted coup of November 23, 1982, which was suppressed after some fighting. Akata-Pore is now under arrest. These conflicts in the military have raised the specters of tribalism and ethnic favoritism, which became so pervasive in AFRC in 1979. Significant numbers of military personnel apparently regard the PNDC as Ewe-dominated: Rawlings is half-Ewe and Rawlings's appointees CDS Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah and Army Commander Arnold Quainoo, are regarded as half-Ewe.

NUGS, the university student group, was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the PNDC's radicalism. Universities were closed during January-April, 1982, while students helped in the movement of cocoa and other tasks. However, student support for the PNDC has waned, and students are strong critics of military brutality, as they were under Acheampong. Students were eager to return to the universities; the most pro-PNDC presidential candidate for NUGS lost in the mid-1982 election; and NUGS has openly opposed the extension of the mandatory National Service Scheme from one to two years and the inclusion of six months of military training in the program.

The regime's broadest base for revolutionary change has emerged through the development of People's Defense Committees (PDC's) and Workers' Defense Committees (WDC's). In many instances they have risen against their managers and bosses, alleging (sometimes accurately, sometimes not) corruption or mismanagement and demanding their removal, and in some cases physically removing the managers and replacing them with others. They monitor activities in many public bodies. As the conflicts between PDC's and WDC's and their managers and superiors increased, PNDC leaders mediated the disputes, shifting the PNDC emphasis somewhat from being watchdogs to increasing production. However, this has not greatly deterred the PDC's, and they have asked the government to give their roles legal status against vigorous counterattacks by confident managers.

The PNDC and Rawlings have stated that anyone who challenges the PDC's challenges the legitimacy of the revolution, and the government has created a regional and national coordinating apparatus to link the PDC's and WDC's to the regime and to one another.

A National Defense Committee with representatives of leading sectors of the PDC's and WDC's oversees PDC activities.

At the same time, the ranks of the opposition to the PNDC have grown. Much of the opposition is passive or non-overt; and thousands of Ghanaians have left Ghana to find work and easier living conditions abroad. Particularly important is the opposition of the local food farmers, whose supplies of foods to the towns have slowed dramatically since the PNDC government imposed heavy price controls. Shortages of local foodstuffs were endemic in Accra and many other towns and cities in the first half of 1982, and people blamed the PNDC. Cocoa farmers resisted PNDC appeals to permit it to lower the cocoa price, and the government decided to continue paying the recently tripled price. Efforts to ensure actual payments to the farmers through the newly established scheme of payment by checks and the rapid extension of banks to the cocoa-growing areas may win the confidence of the cocoa farmers, who have been cheated frequently in the past when their payments were withheld.

The most important public opposition to the regime has come from the lawyers and other professionals. Within a month after the PNDC had seized power, the Ghana Bar Association (GBA) recommended that the PNDC create a broadly based government and prepare to restore civilian rule by September, 1983. The opposition of the GBA and the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies (ARPB) to the PNDC generally was reanimated by the kidnapping and brutal murder of three high court judges and a retired major (a GIHOC personnel director). There was immediate speculation that persons close to the PNDC were motivated by revenge, because the three judges had all been involved either with appeals from AFRC sentences or adverse rulings on petitions for reinstating the dismissed GIHOC strikers. The murders were totally uncharacteristic of Ghana's political life; they aroused widespread shock and indignation and were condemned by the government, which launched investigations. The GBA and ARPB denounced the murders, the PNDC-supported "campaign of HATE" against the rich, PNDC failure to improve economic life, the curfew, the loss of press freedom, the collapse of military discipline and military brutality, and the lack of legal accountability. They reiterated the demand that the PNDC hand power to a broadly based government that would hold elections no later than September, 1983—a call without the resonance to Ghanaians that it had in 1977-1978. The GBA boycotted all courts, commissions of inquiry, and tribunals during a two-week mourning period. Its statements prompted condemnations of the Bar Association and ARPB by the government, the press and PNDC political support groups. Subsequently, PNDC activists

raided and destroyed paraphernalia in various Masonic, Odd Fellow, and other clubs.

The GBA also condemned and decided to boycott a PNDC system of public tribunals, membership in which would be open to Ghanaians by appointment by a board (the first tribunals were presided over by lawyers). Ghana's legal system has permitted many of its most corrupt public officials and businessmen to escape the penalties of the law, a perception widely and strongly held in Ghana. Thus public tribunals were established as a separate legal system, with broad jurisdictions, no rights of appeal, right to counsel, cases brought by the public prosecutor, and guidance in proceedings and decisions by the rules of "natural justice," not "legal technicalities." In late 1982, trials were open to the public and tended to be swift, with long sentences for the guilty divided between work in night-soil (excrement) collection and communal labor.

In late 1982, coup plot announcements and rumors abounded, and at least one major coup effort was made against Rawlings. Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah wrote in his letter of resignation from the PNDC:

If we are honest with ourselves we will be the first to admit that the going has been tough and chaotic and any hope of bringing about an improvement in the standard of living of our people remains doubtful.

He observed that it was not clear who was governing Ghana today, because PNDC decisions were discarded or altered by anyone in the hierarchy.⁵

Nonetheless, the PNDC government survives, and its radical populist impulses are not altogether obscured by Rawlings's preoccupations with security. Its more important programs for social and economic change could not possibly have borne fruit in 1982; but by late 1982 there were some indications the regime would deal with the drastically overvalued cedi. At the end of 1982, however, the future of revolutionary change in Ghana was an open question.⁶ ■

⁵"Ghana Coup Defeated," *West Africa*, November 29, 1982, p. 3065.

⁶In late January, 1983, Ghana opened its borders to admit almost a million Ghanaians expelled from Nigeria; these unemployed returnees may also affect the regime's economy and hence its stability.

SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGY

(Continued from page 114)

bilizes its neighbors, policies of economic and functional collaboration will fail, except among relatively captive or malleable "homeland" regimes.

Looked at in these terms, the effort to detach two pieces of South African land that border on Swaziland

¹⁵See David Robbins, "The South African Land Deal," *Africa Report*, vol. 27, no. 6 (November-December 1982).

¹⁶Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence 1977* (Simonstown: South African Navy, 1977), p. 5.

(the kaNgwane bantustan and the Ngwayuma region of the kwaZulu bantustan) and to grant them to Swaziland fits in with "total national strategy."¹⁵ The territorial transfer would not be an act of charity, despite Swaziland's territorial claims to the area and South Africa's insistence that it merely wants to reunite all peoples of Swazi descent. Rather, Pretoria might gain considerably by the land transfer; most directly, it would deprive nearly one million black South Africans of their citizenship. Swaziland would more than double its population and would be even more dependent on aid and support from South Africa, because it could not absorb these people economically. South Africa would happily parlay Swaziland's subsequent dependence into political gain. In terms of South Africa's politics, kaNgwane has never had the potential for viable independence; it has even less than the other economically pathetic bantustans. KwaZulu's leader, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who has long been a thorn in Pretoria's side, would see his own power undermined in this losing cause. The Ngwayuma region also borders on Mozambique and might buffer the border against ANC (African National Congress) infiltrations. There is also fuzzy speculation that if Ngwayuma becomes part of Swaziland, the United States might approach Mbabane to gain access to and develop Kosi Bay, because the United States is anxious to have a naval base in the Indian Ocean. This would be a politically explosive move if Kosi Bay remains part of South Africa or an "independent" kwaZulu.

Since the Swaziland government of King Sobhuza II is eager to acquire these lands, Pretoria may be seeking to ingratiate itself with Swaziland. This would permit it to use the proposal as a bargaining chip in persuading Swaziland to crack down on ANC operatives on its soil. Pretoria might also like Swaziland to use its position in the Organization of African Unity and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference to frustrate any efforts to weaken South Africa. For whatever reasons, the effort has been temporarily delayed by adverse court rulings, by parliamentary recess, and by the death of Sobhuza II and the resulting Swazi government transition.

But the "total onslaught" has a domestic dimension as well. National party leaders place the blame for their situation on outsiders, but they also realize that domestic change, at least cosmetic change, is required to reduce tensions and stabilize white dominance. To withstand the onslaught the government has proposed a "total national strategy," a comprehensive plan to utilize all the means available to a state according to an integrated pattern. . . . A total national strategy is, therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels and to all functions of the state structure.¹⁶

In South Africa, constitutional reform is part of the domestic strategy. But so is increased police surveil-

lance, intimidation, and suppression, further limitations on civil, political and economic freedoms, and intensified enforcement of tightened security legislation. Illustrative of this trend is the government's intention to introduce an Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill in the 1983 session of Parliament. This would give the authorities greater control of black urbanization and increase black insecurity. Related measures linked to efforts to make the homelands manageable are now in force.

Lately, South African strategists have been talking of a "second front," by which they mean domestic acts of sabotage, especially in rural areas. For this reason, they must shore up the internal security apparatus at the same time that they seek to defuse the tension by instituting constitutional and political reform. To be sure, the issue of black powerlessness will not be rectified by the latest constitutional proposals nor by the homelands policy. No matter how much "separate development" is speeded up or streamlined through land exchanges and consolidations coupled with marginal reforms for urban blacks, it cannot hope to dispel or deflect a deepening black bitterness. To a white society accustomed to stasis, any movement looks like radical concession. White and black perceptions of the situation could hardly be further apart.

So the government's response to "total onslaught" is not simply a military response to the problems of state. General Viljoen has often said, "We believe in offensive defence . . . You have to be aggressive, as this demonstrates your determination."¹⁷ In a piece of South African newspeak that even George Orwell would applaud, in the 1982 *White Paper on Defence* such a stance is labeled "offensive pro-active action."¹⁸ The SADF and the security establishment seek to become even more aggressive.

The army's Logistics Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General H. A. Kotze, has argued that the "world regards a physical trial of strength as the logical result of the friction in southern Africa." Yet fighting would not be confined to the battlefield. "Military preparedness is inseparable from economic strength."¹⁹ He could have added that it is inseparable from race relations, from white unity, from infrastructural development, from an effective foreign policy, from a self-sufficient energy and armaments policy, from control of a critical or too open press (especially when it comes to security matters), from education, and on and on and on.

In short, nothing escapes the total strategy. And in a siege environment, no matter how placid the people may appear on the streets of Johannesburg or on the farms of the eastern Cape, the top officials in South

¹⁷*Financial Mail*, vol. 83, no. 3 (January 15, 1982), pp. 190-191.

¹⁸Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, *White Paper on Defence and Armaments Supply, 1982* (Cape Town: Government Printers, 1982), p. 3.

¹⁹*The Star*, August 13, 1976.

Africa believe that the country is mired in a smoldering war for survival. Theoreticians who believe that a professionalized armed force could keep its officers in the barracks and out of politics are mistaken. Social phenomena in South Africa cannot be and are not considered in isolation. "Total national strategy" may well consume even the most benign and innocent.

This entire policy debate will shape the agenda for years to come; and it contributes to an exciting, heady atmosphere in South Africa. But the real struggle has yet to break and will take place on an altogether different plane. The ability of white South Africa to ready itself for the coming struggle, and the global context, the violence, and the velocity of that struggle may well be determined in South Africa's counsels of state. ■

AMERICAN POLICY IN AFRICA: THE REAGAN YEARS

(Continued from page 101)

opment of minerals in neighboring states. In any event, the United States should try to avoid having in power in South Africa a black majority government that might be hostile to the United States and friendly to the Soviet Union. The consequences of such a situation—it is argued—would lead to the denial of these minerals to the Western powers or the setting of prices so high that it would disrupt Western economies as the 1974 OPEC challenge did.

Formulating policy options in such narrow parameters might have oriented policymakers, but their positions are not based on solid premises. If, for example, one supports the Pretoria regime because of a concern about the continued stability of the southern African region, then one must recognize that the program of apartheid and the stubborn defense of that system by the white minority in South Africa is the single most important source of instability in the region. Not only has the rising resentment of the black majority led to an increasing incidence of strikes, protest demonstrations, and sabotage, but the South African government itself has been waging a form of war against its own people and against unfriendly regimes in neighboring states. Hence, the encouragement the United States gives to the apartheid system either directly or inadvertently contributes to the further destabilization of the region.

Second, the argument that resentment on the part of the present regime towards Western opposition to apartheid could result in a denial of South Africa's minerals to the West also ignores the facts. The entire structure of apartheid and the continued mechanization and computerization of white industry—which makes it less and less dependent on unskilled black labor—is dependent on the foreign sale of minerals. The elaborate surveillance system, moreover, is subsidized by mineral sales. Similarly, South Africa's ability to employ the technology of converting its huge coal

reserves into oil (the one mineral it lacks) is also funded by its mineral wealth; and the white minority's ability to enjoy one of the world's highest standards of living is based on the continuing sale of gold and strategic minerals to whatever customers present themselves. Thus, threats of boycotts by the world community, insistence on enforcement of the Sullivan principles[†] with regard to American firms operating in South Africa, and other "sticks" could be as significant as the Reagan "carrots" are to the Pretoria regime today.

The possibility that the Soviet Union could buy up and stockpile all South Africa's minerals as a calculated denial policy does not take into account the economic development problems faced by the Soviet Union. Indeed, neighboring Angola is a case in point. Despite the fact that the United States government does not recognize the socialist MPLA regime, an American firm, Gulf Oil, has been extracting and marketing Angola's most significant revenue earner. In the Alice-in-Wonderland style of African politics, the Gulf Oil refinery in the Cabinda area of Angola is being guarded by Cuban troops. More, rather than fewer, Western firms—including the former colonialists from Portugal—are being invited to Angola to prospect and develop Angola's vast mineral resources. And as Congressman Howard Wolpe (D., Mich.) pointed out recently, the firm employed by the Socialist government of Angola to negotiate the minerals contracts with foreign firms was Arthur D. Little of Boston. Some of the most vigorous critics of the Angolan policies of the Reagan administration in congressional hearings, moreover, have been American businessmen and investors, who have had few problems in Angola.

POLISARIO, THE WESTERN SAHARA, AND THE OAU

Although southern Africa tends to dominate American policy-planning for sub-Saharan Africa, other crisis areas also claim Washington's attention. One of the abiding troublespots is the Western Sahara, which was formerly under Spanish control. The Spanish withdrew from the phosphate-rich territory partly in response to increasing insurgency efforts on the part of a Saharawian nationalist movement, called Polisario, which had been launched in the early 1970's. The precipitating cause of General Francisco Franco's exodus, however, was the increasingly hostile demands made by King Hassan II of Morocco and President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, who asserted historic claims to the area. The annexation of the Western Sahara and its division between Morocco and Mauritania in 1976 did not go unchallenged by Polisario, which was receiving arms from Libya, the Soviet Union, and neigh-

boring Algeria. The last named did not have completely unmixed motives, because Polisario's success would give it friendlier and more direct access to the Atlantic Ocean for its gas, oil and mineral products from the Sahara. The Soviet Union needs the phosphates for its agriculture.

The Polisario have been very effective insurgents, particularly against the Mauritanians, who decided in 1977 to withdraw entirely from their annexed area after a coup toppled Ould Daddah. The Moroccans immediately occupied the entire territory, but they have had to commit over 40,000 troops to the area to maintain their claim. For the most part, however, the guerrilla tactics of Polisario have confined Moroccan control to a few towns and the heavily defended triangle around the old capital and the phosphate mines, whose operations were disrupted until very recently by the insurgency.

Although about 50 states now recognize Polisario as the legitimate government of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the United States has been "neutral in favor of Morocco." That is, it recognizes Moroccan administrative control of the territory, but defers the question of sovereignty until a referendum on this issue has taken place in the Western Sahara. In fact, however, even before the Reagan administration, the United States was one of the principal suppliers of military hardware and training for Morocco in its struggle against Polisario.

Our motivations for support are mixed. Aside from the traditional friendship between American and Moroccan leaders forged during World War II, the American explanation is framed in terms of global, continental or regional objectives of the United States. That is, United States support for Morocco is in part a response to Polisario's financing by Libya's Colonel Qaddafi and the Soviet Union. Morocco's location at the entrance to the Mediterranean, moreover, gives it strategic importance in view of United States commitments on the southern flank of NATO and its continuing concern about Israel and the Middle East. King Hassan II is one of the few Arab moderates who has given tacit support to President Reagan's peace proposal, hosting the 1982 Rabat Conference of Arab leaders that discussed the plan. Of equal importance to United States Middle East strategy, during a state visit to Washington in May, 1982, Hassan agreed to allow United States access to the Moroccan ports, air bases and other facilities essential to the United States Rapid Deployment Force. Morocco, moreover, has been able—on a much smaller scale, of course—to do for the United States and for France what Cuba has been doing for the Soviet Union in Africa.

In return for Moroccan support on other issues, the Reagan administration recommended to Congress an increase of foreign military sales credits for Morocco from the \$30 million level to \$100 million in 1982.

[†]A voluntary 1977 code mandating nonsegregation and fair employment by American companies working in South Africa, formulated by black General Motor's board member Leon Sullivan.

The United States military, moreover, has been supplying the Moroccans with air-to-ground missiles and has been training Moroccan pilots in the use of electronic antimissile devices needed to defend themselves against the Soviet-made missiles used by Polisario. The Americans have also advised the Moroccans not to stay bottled up in the defensive triangles and to carry the counterinsurgency to the Polisario camps.

The Reagan policies have met with both domestic and international opposition. The House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee—following the advice of Congressman Wolpe's Subcommittee on Africa—recommended in April, 1982, that the military sales allocation be cut to \$50 million. This would indicate continued American faith in Hassan II but would not subsidize American involvement in what is viewed as a West African "Vietnam," which the Moroccans cannot win. The House committee also recommended against United States training missions in Morocco and placed other restrictions on American involvement, to compel the Moroccans to conduct the referendum on self-determination that they had previously consented to. Congressmen were also concerned that the Polisario war had led not only to further militarization, but had fueled inflation, unemployment, and an alarming rural to urban migration in Morocco. Indeed, Hassan might soon suffer the fate of the Shah of Iran, leaving the United States once again a supporter of an unpopular autocrat.

American support of Morocco, moreover, has jeopardized the renewed relationships that the United States has had with Algeria as a consequence of that country's arbitrating role in the 1981 release of the Iranian hostages. Like Nigeria, Algeria is an important alternative to the Middle East as a source for meeting the oil and gas needs of the West. One of the unanticipated casualties of what Algeria and other African states see as the United States-supported war in the Western Sahara is the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The question of seating the Polisario delegation as the representative of the Western Sahara was one of the central factors in the failure of the organization to get a quorum for its August, 1982, meeting in Tripoli or for the revived attempt to do so in November. Morocco had rounded up a sufficient number of moderates on that issue as well as the leaders who objected to the fact that Colonel Muammar Qaddafi—as host of the summit—would automatically become the chairman of the OAU for the coming year.

Although it may serve United States interests not to have Qaddafi occupy such a prominent post, it certainly cannot applaud the weakening of an organization that is just beginning to play a leading role in the peaceful settlement of African disputes. A strong OAU means greater African stability, and that is surely in the interest of the United States. Although there is no evidence that the United States actually worked to

bring about the collapse of the Tripoli summit, its policies are perceived as having had this effect.

QADDAFI, TERRORISM, AND CHAD

Although a discussion of American-Libyan relations more properly belongs in a analysis of United States policy in the Middle East, Libya's Colonel Qaddafi has made himself a factor in the politics of sub-Saharan Africa as well. His aspirations with respect to the OAU chairmanship, his support of Polisario in the northwest, of the Eritreans and the Ethiopians in the east, and the ANC (African National Congress) and SWAPO (Southwest African People's Organization) in the south have given him a continental base for support of insurgency. Not all his moves have been popular with other African leaders, even those who are regarded as part of the more "progressive" camp. Qaddafi came into direct conflict with Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, for example, in the Libyan leader's eleventh hour support of Uganda's Idi Amin Dada during the Tanzanian "liberation" of Uganda.

Libya's motives have also been questioned because of its December, 1980, response to the request of President Goukouni Woddeye of Chad for military assistance. Although the latter was technically the Head of State and thus was legally authorized to request assistance, he is only one of the many rival factional leaders that have been engaged in a multisided civil war almost from the moment of Chad's independence from France in 1960. Chad has existed as a nation state in only the narrow legal sense.

Qaddafi responded eagerly to Goukouni's appeal and immediately announced his plan to merge the two countries. To most Africans, this appeared to be an act of conquest, and Nigeria and others assumed an active role both inside and outside the OAU to secure the withdrawal of Libyan troops in November, 1981. In fact, Qaddafi withdrew before the OAU multinational peacekeeping force (Senegal, Nigeria and Zaire) could assume its duties. Instead of Goukouni being able to take advantage of the vacuum, his rival, Former Defense Minister Hissene Habre, moved swiftly to occupy the capital. Since Habre had the open support of the French and moderate African leaders, the question of seating his delegation at the resumed Tripoli summit meeting became a further factor in the failure of OAU to secure a quorum. It was, ironically, Qaddafi himself who raised the objection that may have scuttled his own conference.

From the viewpoint of the Reagan administration, the Chadian crisis was viewed with alarm not only because it was regarded initially as a potential victory for Qaddafi but because it extended the Libyan-controlled border with the Sudan. After Egypt, the Sudan receives the continent's highest level of AID and United States military support. On many occasions the hostility between Qaddafi and Sudan's President Gaafar al-

Nimeiry has led the former to call on the Sudanese to assassinate their own leader. Shortly after moving into Chad, Qaddafi attempted to form an economic alliance with Ethiopia and South Yemen. Although the situation was undoubtedly exaggerated, the Sudanese leader felt that threats to Sudanese security required the immediate action of the United States. Although the United States added its diplomatic voice to the condemnation of Qaddafi, its actions were restrained. Under Presidents Carter and Reagan, however, the United States has been supportive of Nimeiry because he was the only leader to voice support for the Camp David accord.

As for Chad, the United States was able to find African states that recognized the threat Libya posed to their own interests and were willing to act without direct superpower involvement. The United States allocated \$12 million to provide airlift and nonlethal equipment for the Nigerians and Zairians, while the French similarly supported the Senegalese contingent. The United States is still working through diplomatic channels towards a settlement that will bring all the warring factions together in a government of reconciliation.

THE HORN OF AFRICA

The fourth major area of crisis for United States policymakers in the Reagan era is the Horn of Africa. Central to that crisis have been the efforts of Ethiopian leaders to deal with armed dissent both under the late Emperor Haile Selassie and under the Dergue (led by Colonel Miriam Haile Mengistu) that overthrew the monarchy in 1974. In effect, the Ethiopians must cope with four civil wars simultaneously. The predominantly Amharic-speaking Christians in Addis Ababa have been opposed by four predominantly Muslim groups of insurgents: the Eritreans, the Somali in the Ogaden, the Oromo, and the Tigre.

The struggle has not been limited to Ethiopia. The Somali Republic, which contains only two of the five territories into which the Somali people were divided under European colonial rule, has encouraged the Western Somalis of the Ogaden to revolt; in the mid-1970's, it gave regular Somali army support to their efforts. Beyond this, international involvement has been kaleidoscopic if not Kafkaesque for the last decade. The Soviet Union initially supported Somalia, but was ejected in favor of United States support when Soviet leaders agreed to assist the Ethiopians. Until the coup of 1974, Ethiopia had been almost a military client of the United States. The Libyans complicated the issue, assisting both the Eritreans and the Somalis during the initial phase of the struggle and then supporting the Ethiopians without discontinuing their support of the Eritreans.

American policy under both the Reagan and Carter administrations has been based on the potential threat

posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogate, Cuba (which has anywhere from 10,000 to 30,000 troops stationed there), to Western oil interests in the Persian Gulf and to principal American allies on the Indian Ocean—Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya and Somalia. Although the American relationship with Somalia is complicated by the fact that the United States is reluctant to support Somalia's irredentist claims in either Ethiopia or Kenya, the Reagan administration has entered into a tentative military agreement regarding the use of the Soviet-built port and airbase at Berbera. Undoubtedly American diplomatic moves in the summer of 1982 were instrumental in preventing the reorganized Ethiopian troops and their Cuban "advisers" from carrying the Ogaden war well into Somali territory. It is clear, however, that the United States is expected to bear an increasingly larger share of the burden of supporting more than 600,000 refugees from the Ogaden, who have become a serious problem for Somalia, one of the fourth world's poorest countries.

EPILOGUE

This analysis of the multiple African crises that confront the United States, does not, of course, exhaust the pool of African problems. Nor should we ignore the many less dramatic but positive efforts that the Reagan administration has been making in Africa. The Peace Corps, for example, has actually reentered countries closed to its good work before the Reagan administration. A good deal of our AID money goes to addressing Africa's most critical problems: providing sufficient food, clean water, and disease free areas to the rapidly increasing number of Africans (who have among the highest population increases in the world). There are many public as well as private initiatives, moreover, that have continued and even expanded during the Reagan era and have helped to meet Africa's critical needs for skilled manpower.

Finally, there is the charge that the Reagan administration views African problems exclusively in terms of American interests or in terms of the impact of African policies on areas of the globe where American economic, military and political concerns are greater. On this count, the Reagan administration would probably plead guilty. After all, what is the model of superpower behavior against which the administration is being judged? Successful superpower behavior requires that a superpower cultivate leaders who have the courage to disagree with the superpower. Translated into concrete terms, this means that American policy-makers should be paying greater attention to the Shagans, Nyereres, and Mugabes, rather than limiting their attention to the King Hassans, the Nimeirys, and the arap Mois. And they should not permit themselves to mortgage human rights to strategic myths and to the sensitivities of the apartheid regime in Pretoria. ■

CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN AFRICA'S HORN

(Continued from page 123)

armed incursions into Somalia, it will lose goodwill, since its support would violate a basic rule of inter-African behavior. And if it tries and fails to dissuade Mengistu from such adventurism, the news of domestic African constraints on Soviet influence will travel far and fast.

SOVIET MOTIVES

It is tempting (and perhaps not too farfetched) to suggest that Soviet policy in the Horn is a building block for the Imperium Sovieticus, part of the overall political objective of expanding influence into the third world to align itself with the anti-colonial revolution and to weaken the influence of the dominant Western powers. Ethiopia has great strategic value in Africa and the Middle East, although it is more important for the Red Sea than the Persian Gulf. Given the magnitude of Moscow's investment, it would be difficult to dismiss it as "minor" or vaguely opportunistic. The Kremlin's decision to spend over \$2 billion in military aid in Ethiopia in two years, far more than it spent on the entire continent since the inception of its aid program, is a matter of policy rather than caprice.²

Nor should one shrug off Soviet efforts, in a country where Moscow has no vital economic or military security interests, to maintain some 12,000 Cuban military advisers and over 1,000 Soviet and East European personnel, or the services of top Soviet generals planning and executing military operations or to favor Ethiopia with over half its needs for petroleum imports. Soviet access to air and naval facilities in Ethiopia could, of course, be used to "interdict" or deny Western access to the Persian Gulf; but from a strategic point of view, Ethiopia probably belongs to Moscow's version of a worst case scenario.

DECLINING AMERICAN INTERESTS

In September, 1982, United States Secretary of State George Shultz addressed the United Nations General Assembly to trace the outlines of United States foreign relations. There was a fleeting reference to Namibian independence; in another passage about foreign policy in general, he told the United Nations: "Don't expect too much." These examples illustrate a tacit United States agreement that Africa remains Europe's chief responsibility and that United States policy is supplementary unless its national interests are involved. Such a stance is unpalatable to many African and American observers, but nothing in recent developments in the Horn suggests that it has changed.

²See Daniel S. Papp, "The Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia," *Current History*, March, 1979.

The pattern of United States policy in the Horn follows the general retrenchment inaugurated by the Nixon doctrine, which changed President John F. Kennedy's "we shall bear any burden" injunction to a "we shall bear only select burdens as required by our national interests" guideline. "Our interests," President Richard Nixon specified, "must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around." It is easy to forget that the United States was turning over the Kagnew facility to Ethiopia and had turned down the Emperor's request for more military aid long before the revolution. The presence of Soviet and Cuban forces in Ethiopia did not unduly alarm Washington; it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, and Moscow's heavy subsidies to Iran's Tudeh party that raised the Horn's profile in American policy.

Washington's response was twofold. First, it increased aid to the Sudan and Kenya to try to contain Soviet influence. Second, it secured Somalia's agreement to allow it to use naval and air facilities in Berbera at the southern end of the Red Sea and at Mogadishu, which faces the Indian Ocean, both serving as a link to move conventional units like the Rapid Deployment Force into the Persian Gulf. Somalia is an emergency stepping stone between Egypt and Israel to Saudi Arabia and Oman. For all that, United States expenditures in the Horn indicate a low priority, the massive Soviet effort in Ethiopia notwithstanding.

Neither Presidents Jimmy Carter nor Ronald Reagan sent Somalia even part of the \$40-million worth of defensive military equipment authorized by Congress until the Ethiopian incursion in the summer of 1982. United States interest in Somalia seems to be declining, partly because technology has decreased Somalia's usefulness, but also as a result of some second thoughts about continued access to petroleum.

In the Horn, in 1983, there is a fortunate coincidence between a growing American sensitivity to African problems and a decreasing emphasis on national security considerations in the area.

The violence and misery that shook the Horn in 1982 and in previous years were not inevitable. The decisions to allow or to prevent self-determination or autonomy for Eritrea and to follow pan-Somali dreams were made consciously by ruling elites. There are alternatives to violence in the Horn, and there are elites who favor peaceful settlement. The African taboo against border changes without the consent of the parties involved, which is enshrined in the Charter of the OAU, is an exercise in relative efficiency rather than in justice.

Nonetheless, the Africans have locked themselves into that system, and African leaders will ultimately have to answer if their abstract principles are implemented without flexibility. In the case of the Horn, how many lives and refugees can be justified in the name of political frontiers that make little sense? ■

ANGOLA*(Continued from page 128)*

by Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, have refused to establish diplomatic relations with Angola because of the Cuban presence in the country, which the State Department currently estimates to include approximately 30,000 civilian and military personnel. Luanda's normalization of relations with Senegal and the People's Republic of China in 1982 have left the United States as the only country in the world which—seven years after independence—still refuses to recognize Angola's MPLA government. While the Ford and Carter administrations made diplomatic recognition contingent upon a Cuban withdrawal, neither linked that withdrawal to the negotiations over Namibia. This new wrinkle was introduced by the Reagan administration.

The United States, South Africa and UNITA maintain that there can be no satisfactory resolution of the Namibian problem and no peace inside Angola until "the Cubans" are sent home. It is necessary to put "the Cubans" in quotes because various parties have different understandings of which Cubans and how many must leave. For some, like UNITA, it means all Cubans whether combat or civilians, while South Africa has focused only on the military component. The United States (under both Presidents Carter and Reagan) has exclusively referred to Cuban "combat troops," implying that noncombatant Cuban military personnel could remain, along with civilian technicians. The United States has also indicated privately that not all Cuban combat troops would have to leave, while South Africa and UNITA have publicly insisted that every single one must exit, although privately they acknowledge that at least a few thousand Cuban combat troops could remain after Namibia obtained its independence.

Despite the Reagan administration's assurance to Pretoria in mid-1981 that it would "link" the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola with South Africa's departure from Namibia, Washington did not raise the issue with Luanda until early 1982. After virtually ignoring the Angolan government throughout its first year in office, the Reagan administration held intensive negotiations with the Angolan government throughout 1982. Yet by the end of the year, little progress had been registered. For the United States it was necessary to see progress on a Cuban withdrawal before a South African withdrawal from Namibia could be realized, while the Angolan government has insisted that the South African withdrawal must precede that of the Cubans.

The Angolan and Cuban governments have formally pledged a Cuban withdrawal from Angola under specified conditions. In a joint statement issued on February 4, 1982, in Luanda, the Foreign Ministers of

both countries, Paulo Jorge and Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, committed their governments to a withdrawal "as soon as all signs of a possible invasion" by South Africa had ended. While this statement provoked heated debates within the MPLA central committee over the question of whether the party should openly and definitively commit itself to a Cuban military withdrawal and is reliably said to have caused a stiff rebuke from the Soviet Union, it went essentially unnoticed in the United States and Europe.

The deadlock has proved convenient for Pretoria, and the Republic's increased attacks inside Angola appear calculated to exacerbate Luanda's security concerns. The result is that South Africa has effectively sabotaged the Western contact group's Namibian talks by making it impossible for the MPLA to compromise on the Cuban troop withdrawal without seriously jeopardizing its security.

This is precisely how Pretoria undermined the important negotiations conducted by General Vernon Walters (a United States State Department trouble shooter) in the summer of 1982. In June, the General conveyed his understanding to Angolan President dos Santos that South Africa would not attack Angola during the summer (as it had the two previous years). When Walters returned to Luanda in July for what he hoped was an Angolan agreement on the Cuban withdrawal, he was surprised to learn that South Africa had greatly increased the size of its forces along the border and appeared (based on the experience of the two previous summers) ready to attack. One hour after the General's plane left the country, South Africa bombed an Angolan town, marking the onset of Pretoria's third annual summer invasion of Angola. South African troops continue to occupy important areas in southern Angola and show no signs that they intend to leave in the near future.

PROLOGUE TO A CONCLUSION

It is tragic that Angola has had to spend the material and human resources at its disposal to survive the manipulations of a larger East-West confrontation and the violence of a neighboring battle for independence. Suffering a geographic location next to a giant that finds Angola anathema to its own interests and concerns, this young nation has had no opportunity to use its resources for its own political, social, and economic development.

Nonetheless, Angola fights for survival, a survival precariously dependent in the near future on the reconciliation of its internal divisions and on withstanding South African violence while Namibian independence remains in question.

Over half Angola's population has never experienced an era of peace. Only when the military struggles are concluded will Angola's peoples be in a position to build their own future. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of January, 1983, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Control

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Jan. 27—U.S. and Soviet negotiators resume discussions in Geneva on the reduction of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe; the negotiations have been in recess since November 30, 1982.

Group of Ten

Jan. 17—Meeting in Paris, finance ministers from the 10 major industrial nations agree to triple their contributions to the International Monetary Fund, making a \$20-billion emergency fund available.

Middle East

(See also *U.N.; Israel*)

Jan. 10—U.S. special Middle East negotiator Philip Habib confers in Washington, D.C., with U.S. President Ronald Reagan and then returns to the Middle East to try to negotiate the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon.

Jan. 13—Israeli and Lebanese negotiators in Beirut agree on an agenda.

Jan. 28—After meeting with President Reagan and U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak urges the complete withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon.

Jan. 30—Mubarak ends his U.S. visit.

Nonaligned Movement

Jan. 15—97 3d world countries, professing nonalignment, conclude a 3-day meeting in Managua, Nicaragua, with a communiqué criticizing U.S. policy in Central America and calling for increased economic aid to the region.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Jan. 24—in Geneva, an emergency OPEC meeting ends when members fail to agree on production levels and price discounting.

United Nations (U.N.)

Jan. 18—The Security Council votes 13 to 0, with the Soviet Union and Poland abstaining, to extend the term of the U.N. peacekeeping forces in southern Lebanon another 6 months.

Jan. 27—The U.N. Border Relief Operation reports that U.N. member nations have raised nearly \$16 million to assist relief efforts along the Cambodian-Thai border and to assist Cambodian refugees.

Warsaw Pact

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 5—in Prague, the Warsaw Pact members announce that they are willing to draft an agreement with NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members; each group would agree not to use force against the other.

ANGOLA

(See also *Cuba; South Africa*)

Jan. 26—The official press agency reports that the government is talking with U.S. representatives about independence for Namibia and "other issues connected with security in southern Africa."

ARGENTINA

(See *Brazil; United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

BELIZE

(See *Guatemala; United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

BOLIVIA

Jan. 9—Vice President Jaime Paz Zamora announces that his party is leaving the coalition government of President Hernán Siles Zuazo.

Jan. 20—President Siles Zuazo accepts the resignations of the 6 Cabinet members tendered on January 9.

BRAZIL

Jan. 13—Brazilian Roman Catholic Archbishop Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns releases the names of 7,291 people who disappeared in Argentina in the last few years; the list contains about 3,000 more names than Amnesty International's list.

CHILE

Jan. 10—The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approves an \$882.5-million loan to Chile.

Jan. 14—The government takes over 8 banks; Finance Minister Rolf Luders says that the move is designed to improve confidence in the banking system.

CHINA

(See also *Kenya; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy; Zaire*)
Jan. 2—An official of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade says that China will retaliate economically against U.S. curbs on textiles imports.

Jan. 19—The government announces that it is banning further purchases of cotton, soybeans and chemical fibers from the U.S.

Jan. 25—The Supreme Court reduces the sentence of Chairman Mao Zedong's widow, Jiang Qing, from death to life imprisonment.

CUBA

Jan. 10—140 air-defense missiles are delivered from the U.S.S.R.; U.S. intelligence sources also report that the Cubans have been receiving heavy Soviet arms shipments for the last two years.

Jan. 13—Vice President Juan Almeida Bosque says that "there can be no link whatsoever between Namibian independence and Cuban troops in Angola"; he says that the 30,000 Cubans in Angola will leave only at that government's request.

DENMARK

(See *United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

EGYPT

(See *Intl, Middle East*)

EIRE

Jan. 20—The commissioner and deputy commissioner of the Irish national police force resign after a government investigation reveals that police equipment was used to record secretly the conversations of members of the Cabinet of Prime Minister Charles J. Haughey.

EL SALVADOR

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 12—Lieutenant Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pérez resigns his post; Ochoa resisted orders from Defense Minister José Guillermo García to accept a diplomatic post in Uruguay and precipitated a crisis when he demanded that García resign his post.

ETHIOPIA

(See *Somalia*)

FRANCE

Jan. 1—President François Mitterrand announces that he has ordered military officials to concentrate on strengthening the country's nuclear forces.

Jan. 5—The government bans the Corsican National Liberation Front after the group claims responsibility for 370 raids and bombings on Corsica during 1982.

Jan. 20—in a speech before the West German Parliament, President Mitterrand says although France is a "loyal partner" of the Western alliance, "French arms cannot be taken into account . . . by the two over-armed superpowers" in negotiations about the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

GERMANY, WEST

(See also *France; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 7—President Karl Carstens dissolves Parliament; he calls for general elections on March 6.

Jan. 12—The government accuses the Social Democratic party of undermining Western efforts to force the U.S.S.R. to dismantle its SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe.

Jan. 16—Petra Kelly, head of the Green party, announces that she will lead a "war crimes tribunal" at Nuremberg in February to condemn the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and other nuclear powers for possessing first-strike weapons.

GHANA

Jan. 29—The government reopens part of its border to allow Ghanaians being deported from Nigeria "to return home safely."

GREECE

Jan. 24—Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou tells a gathering of Socialist leaders that U.S. military bases "only serve the interests of the United States" but that Greece could accept their presence if the U.S. guaranteed "us protection against the Turkish menace."

GUATEMALA

(See also *U.K.; Great Britain; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 8—Foreign Minister Eduardo Castillo Arriola announces that the government will allow civilian rule by 1985.

Jan. 13—President Efraín Ríos Montt says that he will drop Guatemalan demands for sovereignty over all of Belize when he meets with British officials later this

month; he says the government only wants the southernmost fifth of Belize.

INDIA

Jan. 6—Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Congress party loses control of two southern states in the January 5 elections.

Jan. 28—All 60 members of the Council of Ministers submit their resignations to Prime Minister Gandhi.

Jan. 29—Reacting to electoral losses at the local level, Gandhi formally accepts the resignation of 7 ministers and appoints 12 new ministers; 3 are named to newly created ministerial posts.

IRAN

Jan. 1—Teheran radio reports that 2 judges have been dismissed for "repeated violations and inhuman and un-Islamic behavior in their posts."

Jan. 19—Prime Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi tells a news conference that a "war budget" of about \$4 billion for 1983 is planned; he says that more than \$1 billion is earmarked to rebuild areas destroyed by the Iraqis.

IRAQ

(See also *Iran; Israel*)

Jan. 2—The government issues the text of an August 25 discussion between U.S. Representative Stephen J. Solarz (D., N.Y.) and President Saddam Hussein in which President Hussein admits that it is "necessary to have a state of security for the Israelis."

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl. Middle East; Iraq; Zaire*)

Jan. 2—The commission investigating the massacre of Palestinian refugees at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Lebanon in September, 1982, announces that it has completed hearing testimony.

Jan. 5—On a visit to the U.S., President Yitzhak Navon tells government leaders that the continuing deterioration in Israeli-Egyptian relations could jeopardize progress on President Reagan's peace initiative.

Jan. 11—Defense Minister Ariel Sharon says that recently released remarks by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on the need for Israel to be secure were only a ploy to "buy public opinion" in order to receive American aid.

Jan. 26—Defense Minister Sharon says that the three warning stations in southern Lebanon that Israel wants to maintain can only be staffed by Israelis.

Jan. 31—President Yitzhak Navon announces that he will not seek another 5-year term as President when his term expires in May, nor will he enter politics.

ITALY

Jan. 24—32 members of the Red Brigades are sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978.

JAPAN

(See also *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Jan. 6—Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone tells a group of American reporters that he wants close relations with the U.S. and South Korea in order to counter the "recent strengthening of Soviet military pressure in the region."

Jan. 11—On a visit to South Korea, Prime Minister Nakasone tells Korean President Chun Doo Hwan that

arrangements have been completed for a \$4-billion, 5-year aid package to Korea from Japan.

Jan. 13—The government announces new import rules that make it easier for 16 items to enter the country.

Jan. 14—The Cabinet announces that the government will allow the export of arms and military technology to the U.S.; a ban on the export of military weaponry and technology was established in 1967.

Jan. 25—The government says it has strongly protested to the U.S.S.R. about Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov's offer to move some European-based SS-20 missiles to Asia.

KAMPUCHEA

(See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Jan. 31—Nong Chan, the largest refugee camp on the Thai-Kampuchean border, is attacked by Vietnamese troops; Red Cross authorities say at least 10,000 refugees have fled from the camp because of the fighting.

KENYA

Jan. 17—Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang ends his 11-nation tour of Africa after he talks with President Daniel arap Moi about increased trade with Kenya.

Jan. 18—Air Force Major General Peter Kariuki is sentenced to 4 years imprisonment for not preventing or stopping the revolt of his troops in the August, 1982, attempt to overthrow the government.

Jan. 24—Former Vice President Oginga Odinga and Tieno Mak'onyango, the assistant editor of *The Sunday Standard*, are ordered to stand trial for treason and plotting to overthrow the government during the August coup.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See also *Japan*)

Jan. 18—in a speech to the National Assembly, President Chun Doo Hwan says he will lift the ban on 567 politicians formerly forbidden to take part in politics.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, Middle East, U.N.; Israel*)

Jan. 6—9 people are killed in fighting between rival Muslim groups in Tripoli. At least 166 people have been killed in the last 7 weeks.

NAMIBIA

(See also *Angola; Cuba; South Africa*)

Jan. 11—Accusing South Africa of seeking to undermine the multiracial alliance, Dirk Mudge, chairman of the South-West Africa Council of Ministers, announces that he is resigning.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Intl, Nonaligned Movement*)

Jan. 8—Government officials charge that former Ambassador to the U.S. Francisco Fiallos Navarro withdrew \$668,000 from the Nicaraguan Embassy's bank account before he left the U.S.; Navarro was dismissed after he gave an interview critical of the government.

Jan. 12—Daniel Ortega Saavedra, coordinator of the Nicaraguan junta, accuses the U.S. of sponsoring a "campaign of terror" against Nicaragua; he says that the government is ready to talk with the U.S. "without conditions" about conflicts in Central America.

NIGERIA

(See also *Ghana*)

Jan. 17—The government orders the expulsion of an estimated 2 million illegal immigrant workers, including almost 1 million Ghanaians.

PERU

Jan. 3—9 new Cabinet members are sworn in by President Fernando Belaúnde Terry; President Belaúnde appoints military officers to all Cabinet posts dealing with defense.

PHILIPPINES

Jan. 5—President Ferdinand Marcos tells reporters that he is seeking an additional \$500 million from the U.S. for two military bases used by the U.S.

Jan. 22—In an effort to reduce the budget deficit in order to qualify for International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans, President Marcos announces an 18-percent cut in government spending.

POLAND

(See also *Vatican*)

Jan. 3—New government-sanctioned unions take the place of the banned union Solidarity.

Jan. 12—The government orders the expulsion within 48 hours of Ruth Gruber, a reporter for United Press International, for "crimes against the state."

Jan. 13—The government says that Gruber's expulsion is intended as a warning to Western reporters.

Jan. 23—*The New York Times* reports that an internal Communist party report on Poland blames Polish leaders for the strikes by Polish workers from 1956 to 1980.

PORTUGAL

Jan. 23—President António Ramalho Eanes announces that he will dissolve Parliament as soon as resigning Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemão completes the 1983 budget.

ROMANIA

Jan. 3—The government informs major Western banks that it will withhold repayment of \$14 billion in debt principal until the debt can be rescheduled; the government still intends to pay interest payments of \$735 million in 1983.

SOMALIA

Jan. 19—President Mohammed Siad Barre offers to meet with Ethiopian Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam; both countries have been fighting in border areas.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Namibia; Zimbabwe*)

Jan. 4—The mixed-race Labor party passes a resolution supporting Prime Minister P. W. Botha's plan for the introduction of nonwhite representation in the central government; the plan excludes blacks.

Jan. 10—Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of the Inkatha Movement, the largest black political organization in South Africa, says that U.S. endorsement of Prime Minister Botha's plan for the introduction of nonwhites into the central government is "a slap in the face to black South Africa."

Jan. 18—Following the resignation of the Council of Ministers in Namibia, the government dissolves the Namibian National Assembly and announces that South Africa is taking over direct rule of the territory.

Jan. 27—Foreign Minister Roelof Botha confirms that negotiations on Namibia are being held with Angola.

SURINAME

Jan. 6—The government announces that it has ordered the expulsion of two U.S. diplomats for "destabilizing activities."

Jan. 19—The military government of Lieutenant Colonel Daysi Bouterse announces that it has asked Henck Herrenberg, its ambassador to the Netherlands, to form a new government; the government says Bouterse will retain executive power.

Jan. 31—15 people including 2 Cabinet ministers and the country's top-ranking army officer have been arrested for plotting to assassinate Bouterse, according to the state radio.

SWEDEN

(See U.S.S.R.)

TANZANIA

Jan. 21—The government officially acknowledges that a "conspiracy" of "several" soldiers and civilians was crushed earlier this month.

THAILAND

(See also *Intl., U.N.*)

Jan. 23—General Arthit Kamlangek announces that the 17-year war against rebels on the northeast borders of Laos and Kampuchea is at an end.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl., Arms Control; Cuba; Germany, West; Japan; U.S., Foreign Policy; Vatican*)

Jan. 1—Tass makes public in advance an editorial for *Pravda* that claims a deadlock has occurred in Geneva in attempts to reduce strategic nuclear arms because of U.S. efforts "to insure unilateral military advantage."

Jan. 11—The government issues a statement clarifying an offer made by General Secretary Yuri Andropov on December 21, 1982, to reduce the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles targeted on West Europe; the statement says that the U.S.S.R. would consider the actual destruction of some of the missiles.

Jan. 14—The political weekly *Novoye Vremya* says that continuing Chinese claims that large parts of the Sino-Soviet border are actually Chinese and the use of anti-Soviet language threaten to undermine Sino-Soviet ties.

Jan. 17—Visiting West Germany, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko says that deployment of U.S. missiles in West Germany would sharpen the danger of nuclear confrontation; Gromyko offers to reduce other Soviet medium-range missiles on the basis of "mutuality" with NATO.

Jan. 18—Foreign Minister Gromyko rejects the U.S.-sponsored "zero option" on the deployment of medium-range missiles.

Jan. 19—The government warns Japan that it may suffer a retaliatory attack "more serious" than the atomic attacks in 1945 if it allows the deployment of weapons aimed at the Soviet Union.

Jan. 23—The government releases economic figures for 1982 that show an increase of only 2.8 percent in industrial output and an increase of only 2.6 percent in national income.

A nuclear-powered Soviet satellite enters the at-

mosphere; it evidently burned up on reentry, but remnants may have landed in the Indian Ocean.

Jan. 27—Tass reports that the government has told Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme that it is ready to join in talks about a nuclear-free zone in central Europe.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *Guatemala*)

Jan. 1—The government imposes a ban on Danish commercial fishing within 12 miles of Britain's North Sea coast; the ban follows Denmark's rejection of a Common Market fishing pact limiting the fish that can be taken by Common Market nations.

Jan. 5—The Foreign Office announces that a planned tour of the Persian Gulf nations by Foreign Secretary Francis Pym has been canceled.

Jan. 7—The captain of a Danish fishing trawler is fined \$51,200 for fishing inside Britain's 12-mile zone.

Jan. 8—British officials say they will press the U.S. not to resume full arms sales to Guatemala; the government is worried about the arms sales since 1,500 British troops are stationed in neighboring Belize. Guatemala does not recognize Belize and claims some of its territory.

Jan. 12—Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher ends her 5-day visit to the Falkland Islands.

Conservative party chairman Cecil Parkinson announces that there will be no early general elections; the announcement is an attempt to shore up the pound, which has recently fallen in value by almost 12 percent.

Jan. 18—A committee of inquiry on the Falklands War clears Prime Minister Thatcher of any blame for failing to anticipate the Argentine invasion of the islands.

Jan. 24—The pound falls against the dollar, reaching a record low.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Jan. 4—After a breakfast meeting at the White House, Republican Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada, one of President Ronald Reagan's closest advisers in Congress, warns the President to ease military spending and seek more cuts because of what he terms "terrifying" deficit projections.

Jan. 5—President Reagan names White House assistant Elizabeth H. Dole as Secretary of Transportation.

Jan. 6—in Washington D.C., a federal district court judge orders the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to take action within 20 days to protect workers from a cancer-producing gas known as ethylene oxide. More than 100,000 workers, mainly hospital workers, are being exposed to the sterilizing agent.

In a decision effective at once, the Interstate Commerce Commission decides to remove the 48-year-old barrier preventing railroads from moving into the commercial trucking industry.

Jan. 7—The Justice Department reveals it is trying to set penalties of some \$115 million on the LTV Corporation because of the alleged failure of 5 of its plants to meet Clean Air Act requirements.

Jan. 10—Congressional sources reveal that the President has fired Richard Staar, U.S. ambassador at the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR).

President Reagan asks White House staff members to secure clearance before discussing certain matters with reporters, according to David R. Gergen, White House Director of Communications.

Jan. 11—The Justice Department orders agencies to charge fees to individuals asking for information under the Freedom of Information Act unless the individuals can prove that "there is a genuine public interest in the subject matter . . ." and can satisfy 4 additional requirements.

Jan. 12—The President names former Massachusetts Republican congresswoman Margaret M. Heckler to succeed Richard S. Schweiker as Secretary of Health and Human Services. Schweiker's resignation is effective today.

President Reagan fires Eugene V. Rostow as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Kenneth L. Adelman is named to replace him.

Morton Abramowitz replaces Staar at the MBFR talks in Vienna.

Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan says the administration will not suggest major tax increases in 1983 or 1984.

Jan. 17—The Federal Environmental Protection Agency lists 83 sites in Missouri suspected of being contaminated with toxic dioxin. Missouri officials suspect the contamination of 100 sites.

Jan. 19—Interviewed on the Satellite Program Network, Interior Secretary James Watt says that America's Indian reservations are "an example of the failures of socialism."

Jan. 20—at a White House news conference, President Ronald Reagan claims that his policies have put "America on the mend"; he says that Congress never passed his full-economic plan, a failure that has handicapped his efforts to reform the economy.

The National Commission on Social Security gives its final report to President Ronald Reagan; the report recommends no basic changes in the Social Security system; it calls for higher payroll taxes and a delay in cost-of-living benefit increases as a means of reducing outlays.

Jan. 21—Education Secretary T. H. Bell proposes new regulations to take effect July 1 under which male students refusing to register for a possible draft will not be eligible for federal education loans.

President Reagan appoints 4 men to interim appointments on the Legal Services Corporation.

Jan. 22—Officials at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission report that they have begun checking to see whether nuclear plants across the nation are using fraudulently labeled substandard steel components.

Jan. 24—Chairman of the United States Parole Commission Benjamin Baer issues new and stricter federal guidelines for the issuance of paroles.

The Department of Health and Human Services issues a new rule that requires federally financed clinics to notify within 10 days the parents of any child under the age of 18 who receives prescription contraceptives; the rule will take effect February 25 unless blocked by a court ruling.

Jan. 25—President Reagan gives his State of the Union Message to Congress and the nation. He calls for a freeze on spending and a standby tax increase for fiscal 1986-1988.

Jan. 28—The White House briefs Republican congressional leaders on President Reagan's budget for fiscal 1984 and provides them with a 45-page summary.

Jan. 31—President Reagan sends Congress his proposed \$848.5-billion budget with a \$189-billion deficit for fiscal 1984; of a \$43.5-billion rise in spending, \$30 billion will go to the military. The budget anticipates savings of \$19 billion on nonmilitary programs by freezing domestic spending and calls for standby tax increases starting in 1986 (including a personal income tax surcharge and an excise tax of \$5.00 per barrel on oil) unless the deficit is brought under control.

Speaking to a convention of Christian broadcast ministers in Washington, D.C., President Reagan affirms that he favors school prayer, tax credits for parochial schools, and a ban on abortion.

Civil Rights

(See also *Supreme Court*)

Jan. 7—The Justice Department asks the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans to overrule a judgment issued by 3 members of the court under which the judges approved a "race-conscious quota system" for choosing police officers in New Orleans designed to remedy past discrimination. This is the first time the Justice Department has challenged the quota system in court.

Jan. 10—in Chicago, U.S. district court Judge Milton Shadur approves the Chicago Board of Education's voluntary school desegregation plan, which does not provide for busing to achieve desegregation.

Jan. 21—in U.S. district court in Chicago, the Justice Department charges that the suburb of Cicero, "through its officials . . . has verbally and physically harassed blacks attempting to migrate to Cicero, including overt actions to physically remove such blacks from the town."

Economy

Jan. 1—the Labor Department reports that it will include military personnel based in the United States in its employment statistics starting with January; the unemployment rate figure for January will probably be slightly lower as a result.

Jan. 3—Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation chairman William Isaac reports that the agency has provided some \$175 million in additional capital to 15 large and financially troubled savings banks, most of which are in New York City.

Jan. 5—According to *Automotive News*, the U.S. auto industry sold only 7,978,487 units in 1982, down 6.3 percent from 1981; 1982 was its worst year since 1963.

Jan. 7—the Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate for December was 10.8 percent; the annual rate for 1982 was 9.8 percent.

Jan. 10—the New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones industrial average reaches a new high of 1,092.35.

Jan. 11—Many of the nation's leading banks lower their prime rate to 11 percent.

Jan. 14—the Labor Department reports that its producer price index rose 0.1 percent in December.

Jan. 19—the Commerce Department reports that the nation's gross national product (GNP) declined at an annual rate of 2.5 percent in the last quarter of 1982.

Jan. 21—the Labor Department reports that its consumer price index fell 0.3 percent in December.

Jan. 26—the Commerce Department reports that the U.S. balance of trade deficit was \$3.4 billion in December and a record \$42.7 billion for all of 1982.

Jan. 28—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 1.5 percent in December.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl. Arms Control, Middle East, Nonaligned Movement; Angola; China; Germany, West; Greece; Israel; Japan; Nicaragua; Philippines; Poland; Suriname; U.S.S.R.; United Kingdom, Great Britain*)

Jan. 6—State Department spokesman John Hughes says that the Warsaw Pact's call for an East-West non-aggression treaty "at first glance . . . does not seem to represent anything new."

Jan. 7—Hughes reports that the U.S. has officially expressed concern over the possible deployment of Soviet SA-5 long range antiaircraft missiles in Syria to Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.

Hughes also reports that, effective today, the U.S. is lifting the 5-year-old embargo on arms sales to Guatemala; this will permit Guatemala to buy \$6.3 million in aircraft spare parts.

Jan. 8—President Reagan says that recent proposals by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union establish "a serious foundation for progress" for arms negotiations that are to resume in Geneva in February.

Jan. 13—The 4th round of U.S.-Chinese negotiations for an agreement to limit imports of Chinese textiles into the U.S. ends without agreement; the State Department announces that the U.S. will impose import quotas on some 33 categories of goods, retroactive to January 1.

Jan. 17—White House and State Department spokesmen comment unfavorably on a reported informal agreement on missile deployment worked out last July between U.S. negotiator Paul Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli Kvitsinsky; the informal agreement appeared to relax the U.S. call for a "zero-zero solution."

Jan. 19—The White House reports that national security adviser William Clark will head a Cabinet-level committee to improve U.S. public relations with its allies to combat the "Soviet peace offensive."

President Reagan meets with Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone at the White House; the President warns that Japan's trade restrictions "continue to weigh heavily" on mutual relations.

Jan. 21—President Reagan certifies to Congress that despite "great obstacles" El Salvador is making progress in human rights and democratic government; the certification allows the U.S. to continue to send military aid to El Salvador.

Jan. 29—Secretary of State George P. Shultz leaves on a 12-day trip to Japan, China and South Korea to discuss strained foreign relations.

Jan. 30—in Tokyo, Secretary Shultz says that the U.S. has no new proposals to stimulate the stalled negotiations on foreign troop withdrawal from Lebanon.

In West Germany, Vice President George Bush begins a 7-nation, 12-day public relations and fence-mending tour of West Europe.

Jan. 31—in West Berlin, Vice President George Bush reads a letter to the people of Europe from President Reagan; the President proposes that he and Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov meet to sign a treaty banning all intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles.

In Japan, Secretary of State Shultz says that no U.S.-Soviet weapons accord will be negotiated at the expense of Japan's security.

Labor and Industry

Jan. 25—The General Public Utilities Corporation, the operator of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, and the Babcock & Wilcox Company, manufacturers of the plant's nuclear reactor, reach an out-of-court settlement in a damage suit by the utility against the company; Babcock & Wilcox will pay the utility \$37 million in rebates over the next 10 years.

Jan. 26—The Bethlehem Steel Corporation reports the largest quarterly loss in U.S. corporate history; \$1.15 billion for the 4th quarter of 1982 and a total loss of \$1.47 billion for 1982.

Jan. 31—Members of the Independent Truckers Association begin a nationwide strike to protest increased taxes.

Legislation

Jan. 3—The 98th Congress convenes.

Jan. 6—President Ronald Reagan signs a bill increasing the federal gas tax 5 cents a gallon; Congress passed the bill December 23.

Jan. 7—President Reagan signs legislation establishing a national policy on the disposal of nuclear wastes; Congress passed the bill on December 20.

Jan. 14—President Reagan vetoes legislation creating 7 wilderness areas in Florida because of the cost to the government.

Military

Jan. 3—President Reagan appoints Brent Scowcroft to head an 11-member commission to study alternative ways to base the MX missile.

Jan. 21—The Pershing 2 missile makes its first successful 800-mile test flight.

Supreme Court

Jan. 2—in his annual report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice Warren Burger asks Congress to ease the workload of the federal courts.

Jan. 24—The Supreme Court refuses to hear an appeal of a lower court's ruling on a desegregation order in Nashville, which involves widespread forced busing of pupils to achieve integration; the desegregation order stands.

VATICAN

Jan. 29—A senior official denies reports that Pope John Paul II sent a letter to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in which Pope John Paul threatened to return to Poland and head a resistance movement if the Soviets invaded Poland in the winter of 1981-1982.

ZAIRE

Jan. 3—Ending his visit to Zaire, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang cancels a \$100-million debt owed by Zaire to China.

Jan. 19—President Mobutu Sese Seko announces that Israel will help modernize Zaire's military.


ZIMBABWE

Jan. 2—Security Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa says that South Africa is arming and recruiting dissidents to infiltrate southern Zimbabwe.

Jan. 15—John Hickman, the former commander of the Rhodesian army, is detained without charge by authorities. ■

Nations of Africa

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